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Using this guide 
This guide is one of several addressing different aspects of Management of Residual 
Explosive Remnants of War (MORE) and linking with wider information resources held by the 
GICHD.  It should be read in conjunction with other guides in the series.  Related publications 
are indicated in the text and a range of tools, that may help users when addressing their 
own situations, are identified wherever they are relevant.  User notes for the various tools 
are also available through the GICHD web site. 
Icons and Tools 
Icons are used to help users of the guide understand where different aspects fit into the 
overall risk management cycle and into the wider context of MORE. 
The risk management cycle icon indicates which elements of the cycle a 
document, guide or publications relates most directly to.  In the case of this 
guide the icon to the left shows that it relates to ‘understanding the context’, 
‘evaluating risk’ and ‘treating risk’. 
The quadrant icon shows how an individual topic relates to the MORE context; 
whether it relates to a technical or non-technical matter, and whether it relates 
to a pro-active event, activity and decision before discovery of an ERW or a 
reactive one post-discovery.  More details about the quadrant diagram are 
available in the Tool Brief at the GICHD website. 
The tools icon shows that a tool is available through the GICHD website to assist 
users in addressing this aspect of the MORE system. 
The publications icon shows when another publication in the GICHD MORE 
series bears specific relevance to the topic and is available at the GICHD 
website. 
Management of Residual ERW (MORE) – 
Risk Management 
For the purposes of MORE risk is defined as ‘the effect of uncertainty on objectives’.  Risk 
management consists of a coordinated set of activities to direct and control a project, 
organisation, programme or national system with regard to risk.i  Less formally risk has been 
defined as conveying the ‘idea of a possibility of danger’.ii 
At its core the management of residual ERW (MORE) is a risk management process, although in 
many cases (such as in Western European countries dealing with ERW from the first and 
second world wars) it comprises a system that has evolved organically, rather than one that has 
been designed and developed in a directed and coordinated way.   
In countries approaching transition from pro-active mine action programmes to more reactive 
MORE systems, there are opportunities to apply principles of strategic planning and risk 
management to develop efficient and effective MORE systems that are well adapted to local 
circumstances and conditions. 
This briefing paper provides an overview of risk management as it can be applied to MORE. 
Other publications in the GICHD’s MORE library include information on the experience of 
countries that have been dealing with ERW for periods of many decades and on the various 
tools and techniques that can be used to help understand and develop MORE systems. 
The risk management cycle 
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General principles 
Like many management processes at the strategic and operational level risk management is a 
cycle.  It starts with analysis of the context, within which MORE is carried out, before 
identifying risks that may be present.  Risk analysis is based upon quantifying, or otherwise 
assessing, the likelihood and consequence of the risk should it become reality.  Once risks have 
been analysed they can be evaluated against risk criteria established at the MORE policy level 
(in essence to decide whether they matter or not).  The results of the evaluation determine the 
need to treat risks, using a variety of potential controls, to ensure that they remain at a 
tolerable level.  All risks are then reviewed at appropriate intervals to ensure that the MORE 
system remains relevant, effective and efficient. 
MORE as a system or programme 
In many countries the residue of older conflicts (such as the two world wars or the US civil war) 
is managed through systems that have evolved over time, without the development of any 
single coherent programme of management.  They constitute systems, but many of them have 
little or no central direction.  Some elements are actively managed (such as military EOD 
response units), but other aspects are allowed to function in a more reactive way (such as 
some legal systems dealing with liability cases arising from work or incidents associated with 
ERW). 
Countries dealing with the residue of more recent conflicts, and especially ones where 
landmines have been present may be more familiar with the structured and directed systems 
associated with mine action programmes (MAPs).  In these situations there is a great deal of 
central management, direction and control.  
Despite their apparent differences, both approaches are founded upon a similar requirement 
to ensure that the effect of ERW on society is tolerable.  Directed programmes are likely to 
have strategic plans, with explicitly stated objectives; more diffuse evolved systems may not 
include such clear statements of purpose and objectives, but they reflect similar expectations. 
In both cases the MORE system is surrounded by a ‘context’ – the environment (internal and 
external to the system) within which they exist and within which they need to fulfil their 
purpose.  There may be variations in context between directed and diffuse MORE systems, but 
understanding the local context is fundamental to ensuring that the risks associated with ERW 
are appropriately managed.  Both types of system can benefit from the experience of the 
other. 
Understanding the MORE context 
Important elements of the MORE context include: 
· Political aspects:  current government policies and the implications of changes of
government.  Political decisions, policies and strategies are likely to influence other
aspects of the context, particularly in relation to the availability of funding for elements
of the MORE system and for the allocation of roles and responsibilities to the various
actors and sectors associated with ERW.  The relationship between political elements
(different ministries and agencies) and the allocation of responsibilities relevant to
MORE are important aspects of the context.
· Legal and regulatory aspects:  In some cases this may include aspects of international
humanitarian law.  In all cases there is national legislation relevant to MORE.  More
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fundamentally, the general approach to the law and the legal system adopted within a 
country (code law, common law, Sharia etc.) influences questions of responsibility and 
liability as they relate to MORE.  Regulations may reflect both international and 
national legislation, as well as accepted practice within specific industries and sectors. 
The mine action industry is familiar with IMAS and NMAS, as well as IATGs, but MORE 
systems typically also encompass aspects of national construction and labour 
regulation as well as safety and the environment. 
· Financial and Economic:  The general circumstances faced by an ERW-affected country
influence both the scale of any ERW response and the degree to which the government
wishes to be pro-active in allocating public money to MORE.  In many cases, and as
time passes, it is common to place more of the financial burden on land users and
developers, rather than central government.  Major changes in the context (such as
during transition from a mine action programme to a residual contamination scenario)
may demand upheaval in the way that activities are financed.  The scale and nature of
economic activity (such as during periods of extensive construction and infrastructure
development) may also influence the likelihood of people coming into contact with
ERW.
· Information aspects: the availability of information about ERW and its effects on
society and the economy is an important part of the context.  Circumstances where
there is little reliable information about the nature and impact of ERW may lead to
increased uncertainty (remembering that risk is defined as the effect of uncertainty on
objectives).  Conversely, the availability of plentiful and reliable data should provide an
opportunity for effective and efficient evidence-based risk management, but unless
there are appropriate mechanisms in place to ensure that the data is collected and
analysed, and the results of that analysis are made available to decision-makers; the
opportunity may be missed.
· Capacities and capabilities:  The availability of skills, assets and the scale of that
availability are key parts of the MORE context.  Some risk controls may rely upon the
availability of suitable assets in sufficient quantities.
· Social aspects:  The general expectations of society and their perceptions of what is
and isn’t acceptable in terms of the impact of ERW upon society represent an
important part of the risk context.  Different societies have different expectations from
MORE, and those expectations may change over time – what a society regards as
acceptable in terms of public safety changes significantly from a period of conflict,
through an immediate reconstruction period to the more comfortable and risk averse
circumstances likely to prevail long after the conflict has passed.  Societies may have
perceptions of ERW risks that are not consistent with the reality of those risks.
Aspects of the context may further vary between local, regional, national and, in some cases, 
international levels. 
ERW risks give rise to both individual and societal concerns.  While MORE risk management 
seeks to manage the reality of risk, it must also adequately reflect societal concerns that 
typically relate to risks: 
· That could cause multiple fatalities;
· Where it is difficult for people to estimate intuitively the actual threat;
· Where exposure involves vulnerable groups (such as children);
· Where risks and benefits are unevenly distributed (so some groups of people bear
more risk than others, or where less risk may be borne by people in the future).
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People tend to be more averse to such risks and are more likely to demand rigorous 
government legislation.  This is the opposite of hazards that are more familiar, and that may 
give rise to greater risks.  A key objective of MORE is to achieve a greater alignment between 
the reality of ERW risks and society’s concerns (or confidence) in their management. 
A range of tools is available to help understand the context in which MORE takes place.  They 
include: 
· The MAP institutional architecture diagram.  While the MORE context may be different
from the MAP context, the same basic arenas remain valid:
o Government arena;
o International arena;
o Local communities arena;
o Market arena; and
o MORE arena
· PESTLE – as an aid memoir and framework for identifying and considering aspects of
the MORE context under the headings of Political; Economic; Social; Technological;
Legal; and Environmental.
· Case studies of historical examples of ERW related events, incidents and programmes.
See Developing MORE Policy and Practice for more information on understanding the context. 
Identifying ERW risks 
The aim of risk identification is to create a comprehensive list of risks associated with the 
presence of ERW.  Note that risks are not only those that have the potential to cause direct 
human harm, but may also include those that can influence economic activity, freedom of 
movement and other aspects of importance to a society and economy. 
The risk identification process should: 
  
· Include risks whether or not their source is under the control of the MORE
programme/system;
· Include risks even though the risk source or cause may not be evident;
· Include examination of knock-on effects;
· Consider a wide range of consequences.
Access to up to date information and wide consultation are essential to comprehensive risk 
identification.  Any shortcomings in the risk identification process may result in ERW risks being 
missed and not addressed through the overall MORE system. 
The purpose of risk identification (and subsequent 
analysis) is to understand the reality of ERW risks, as 
opposed to the perception of those risks (which may 
be far removed from the reality).  The way in which 
ERW risks are perceived by society and the general 
public is an important part of the MORE context, but 
effective MORE is based upon identifying and 
understanding the reality of those risks. 
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ERW risks actually exist only when three associated factors combine:  ERW contamination 
must be present at a location where activity (capable of interacting with the contamination) is 
taking place, or will take place. 
In the MORE risk diagram (above) a real risk only arises in the central red zone of the diagram. 
All three contributing factors need to be understood when identifying MORE risks.   
Perception of risk may extend well outside the red zone.  Mechanisms for addressing the 
different areas of perceived and potential risk are discussed below. 
Location 
The location of ERW needs to be understood, and wherever possible described, in three 
dimensions.  Shallow contamination is likely to have a greater potential to interact with a wider 
range of human activity then deep buried ERW.  When assessing the depth ranges within which 
ERW is likely to be encountered MORE risk managers need to take into account: 
· The types of weapon likely to be present;
· The mode of operation associated with their deployment (fired, dropped from aircraft,
emplaced etc.);
· The history of different land areas following the conflict period; and
· Environmental, geographical and geological factors.
History and Geology in London 
In London rubble from collapsed buildings was removed in bulk during the immediate 
post World War II reconstruction phase.  As a result shallow contamination is unlikely in 
many parts of the city that were subject to bombing, but areas away from the city, where 
rubble was dumped, may still contain smaller calibre ERW even though they may not 
have been subject to bombing. 
Much of London has a layer of dense gravel several metres below ground level.  Air 
dropped bombs that may have penetrated the ground, when they failed to explode, 
could not pass through the layer of gravel, providing a geological maximum depth 
beyond which it is highly unlikely that bombs will be found. 
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1945 Bomb damage assessment map from London 
showing the area around Waterloo station 
Allied aerial reconnaissance photograph from 
Germany 
In some countries formal surveys may have been undertaken, in others information may be 
held in a wide variety of archives and databases.  In many cases indirect evidence may be used, 
such as bomb damage assessment maps (an extensive collection of which were made in 
London in 1945) or aerial photography (in Germany images provided by the allied forces after 
World War II remain one of the primary sources of risk assessment data).  
Contamination 
The type, age, condition and status of contamination influences the risks associated with the 
contamination and its potential for interaction with human activity. 
Different weapon types present different risks depending on how they were designed to 
function, what happened to them when they were used, and the effects of the environment 
around them as they age. 
An abandoned, unfuzed air dropped weapon is likely to present a lower risk than a fuzed and 
armed anti-personnel landmine, but over time a range of factors change the risk profile.  After 
thirty years out in the open the landmine may have become non-functional as key components 
rust, seize up or become obstructed by the ingress of sand, plant roots or other debris.  At the 
same time the abandoned air dropped weapon may have become a good deal more 
dangerous, especially if it contains other hazardous materials such as rocket propellants. 
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Surface laid P4B anti-personnel mine showing the 
effects of thirty years exposure to UV light, rain, 
wind, snow and temperature cycles, in the 
Falkland Islands/Malvinas. 
Abandoned S24 rockets in northern Mozambique containing 
rocket propellant in which the stabilisation compound is likely 
to have degraded, leaving weapons that are unstable and 
potentially liable to auto-ignition. 
Many aspects of risk associated with ERW change over time.  The effects of ageing on weapons 
are of particular importance.  Evidence suggests that most weapons become safer over time, 
but on some occasions that may not be the case.  In some parts of Germany ERW includes UK 
and US air dropped bombs with a chemical fuzing system which has on rare occasions, 
spontaneously exploded without any apparent human interaction.  Rocket propellant systems 
are particularly susceptible to increased sensitivity owing to the effects of ageing. 
The GICHD MORE Guide to Ageing provides further details on ageing and its effects on ERW. 
Activity 
Different activities bring different possibilities of interacting with contamination.  The least 
intrusive activities (human or animal foot traffic over open ground for instance) can only 
interact with weapons close to, or on the surface and in functioning condition.  However, 
circumstances in which foot traffic may be relatively safe, may also give rise to other activities 
that bring much higher risks, such as children picking up and playing with weapons, or throwing 
them onto a fire, or scrap metal collection (an activity that is banned in Vietnam because of the 
risks it presents, but which still goes on nevertheless). 
More intrusive activities include agriculture (manual or with machinery), the digging of shallow 
foundations for buildings or roads and the construction of drainage and irrigation ditches. 
The most intrusive activities are generally associated with major civil engineering projects such 
as creating deep foundations for high-rise buildings, tunnelling and pipeline laying. 
Each type of activity has the potential to interact with different types of ERW, but can only do 
so if the types that can be interacted with are actually present and are in a condition that gives 
rise to risk. 
Tools for identifying MORE risks 
· Brainstorming – amongst groups of informed and experienced individuals;
· Check lists – based on experience gained in other affected regions and over time;
· Structured meetings and workshops;
· Structured what if techniques (SWIFT) and scenario analysis;
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· Cause and effect analysis – using ‘fishbone’ diagrams;
· Analysis of historical data, media reports and case studies
Figure 1:  Extract from London Olympics Park Risk Analysis: BAe Systems Ltd 
Analysing ERW risks 
Risk analysis is the process of developing an understanding of identified risks.  It provides an 
input into the risk evaluation stage and to decisions about whether risks require treatment. 
Risk analysis may inform prioritisation processes and assist in making choices about how 
resources should be used to best effect. 
Risk analysis includes an assessment of the causes and sources of risk, their consequences, and 
the likelihood that consequences will occur.  One event or decision may have multiple 
consequences and may affect multiple objectives and there may be inter-relationships 
between different risks and their sources. 
Factors such as divergence of opinion amongst experts, uncertainty, the availability, quality, 
quantity and relevance of information, or the limitations of modelling should be clearly stated 
and highlighted when documenting risk analysis. 
Analysis may be quantitative, qualitative or a combination depending on the availability of data 
and specific circumstances and conditions. 
Tools for analysis of MORE risks 
One of the simplest and most widely used tools for assessing risk is the risk matrix (as 
illustrated below).  There is no one set of standard ways of scoring the severity and likelihood 
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of a risk using this approach, but any system should be used consistently and should be agreed 
by key stakeholders. 
Figure 2:  A typical risk assessment matrix 
In many cases, especially where a substantial body of statistical data is unavailable the 
likelihood of an event is scored using a descriptive approach.  On those occasions when 
statistical data is available, MORE managers may choose to use mathematical probability 
scores instead. 
Other tools that may be useful during risk analysis include: 
· Statistical analysis of historical data (if it is available), which can be used to enhance the
risk matrix approach as well as to provide results for consideration during wider policy
discussions;
· Structured What If Techniques (SWIFT) and scenario modelling used to explore the
possible risk implications of various events, changes in policy or management
decisions;
· Root cause, and cause and effect analysis, using the Ishikawa or Fishbone diagram to
help identify a range of causes associated with resulting effects; and
· Bow Tie analysis – can be used to display and describe a risk that has a number of
possible causes and a range of consequences.  It can be simpler to use and understand
than more complex tools.
The GICHD MORE Tool Briefings provide further information on how and when to use the 
various tools.  Many other tools are available to support risk analysis and MORE managers are 
encouraged to investigate further the availability and suitability of different tools and 
techniques for their own circumstances. 
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Evaluating ERW risks 
Risk evaluation is the process of deciding which risks require treatment and to prioritise 
treatment action.  Risk evaluation involves the comparison of the results of risk analysis with 
risk criteria identified as part of the context analysis. 
Risk criteria and the objectives of MORE are often poorly defined within both mine action 
programmes and established MORE systems.  At the same time there are many unwritten 
criteria and objectives that are well understood and accepted by governments, practitioners 
and general populations.  Objectives (formal or unwritten) typically include: 
· Keeping people safe
· Growing the economy
· Responding to emergencies
· Spending public money efficiently
· Maintaining public confidence
· Encouraging commercial projects
· Encouraging investment
While risk criteria may not always be clearly defined in mine action and MORE, they do exist.  In 
most countries any risk of harm to a member of the public (e.g. a user of released land) 
following mine action activity is regarded as unacceptable.  Decisions about how land is 
assessed and dealt with through the land release process are affected by awareness of this risk 
criterion (even if it is not generally written down anywhere).   
Risk of harm to a technician (such as a deminer) dealing with ERW is generally regarded as 
being highly undesirable: something that should be avoided if at all possible.  While both are 
regarded as events to avoid there is clearly some difference in the criteria that are applied – 
harm to a member of the public is seen as being worse than harm to an ERW worker. 
In other circumstances criteria may relate to the political and reputational risks that a decision-
maker faces when trying to weigh up the need to spend money wisely and appropriately, while 
not wanting to be held responsible for an accident to a member of the public.  In most cases 
political, economic and financial criteria inform MORE decision-making. 
The wide range of consequences (physical, economic, political, etc.) presented by ERW risks 
make up a complex and changing situation.  In some cases governments at national or regional 
levels may establish set criteria.  In others decisions about what is acceptable may be left to 
markets, the judiciary or individuals and organisations to decide. 
Different models are found in different countries.  Further information on the various 
approaches found in MORE situations can be found in the GICHD MORE Policy Guide. 
Not all ERW risks require treatment and some risks may require treatment from the 
perspective of one stakeholder, but not from another.  Even when not explicitly stated, 
decisions about how to respond to the presence of ERW are informed by reference to risk 
criteria. 
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When determining whether risk treatment is required in relation to MORE it may be useful to 
compare risks with those relating to other aspects of the work and activities a society engages 
in. 
Table 1:  Annual risk of death from industrial accidents (extracts from figures in UK HSE Publication Reducing Risk, 
Protecting People) 
Industrial sector Annual risk Annual risk per million 
Mining and quarrying 1 in 9,200 109 
Construction 1 in 17,000 59 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fishing (not sea fishing) 
1 in 17,200 58 
Manufacturing industry 1 in 77,000 13 
Service sector 1 in 333,000 3 
Table 2: Average annual risk of death as a consequence of an activity in the UK (extracts from figures in UK HSE 
Publication Reducing Risk, Protecting People) 
Activity Risk 
Maternal death in pregnancy (1994 – 96) 1 in 8,200 maternities 
Surgical anaesthesia (1987) 1 in 185,000 operations 
Scuba diving (2000/01) 1 in 200,000 dives 
Rail travel accidents (1996-2000) 1 in 43,000,000 passenger journeys 
Aircraft accidents (1991 – 2000) 1 in 125,000,000 passenger journeys 
Tools for evaluating risk 
· Structured What If Techniques (SWIFT) – to identify consequences and consider them
in light of defined, formal and informal public, legal, contractual and other expectations
and requirements;
· Cause and Effect analysis – to understand possible effects and compare them against
criteria;
· MORE Quadrant diagram – helps decision makers consider how risks relate to different
groups of stakeholders at different stages in the MORE process.
ALARP 
The concept of a risk being ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP), has parallels with the 
principle of application of all reasonable effort found within concepts of land release in mine 
action.  ALARP is often used as criteria in relation to ERW.   
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Figure 3:  The ALARP concept (after ISO 31010) 
In the UK the HSE believes that an individual risk of death of one in a million per annum for 
both workers and the public corresponds to a very low level of risk and should be used as a 
guideline for the boundary between the broadly acceptable and tolerable (ALARP) region.  For 
comparison the ‘background’ risk in the UK is around one in a hundred per year, averaged over 
a lifetime.iii   
The UK HSE acknowledges that defining the boundary between the ALARP region and the 
unacceptable can be more difficult, but as guidelines it suggests that a risk of 1 in 1,000 per 
annum represents the dividing line between what would be just tolerable for many categories 
of worker and what would be intolerable other than for a small number of specialist groups. 
For members of the public who have a risk imposed on them ‘in the wider interest of society’, 
the limit is judged to be 1 in 10,000 per annum.iv 
Treating ERW risks 
Risk treatment is the process of modifying risk - in the MORE context that usually means taking 
action to reduce, or maintain, a risk at a level acceptable to relevant and affected stakeholders. 
Risk is usually treated using one or more of the following options: 
· Avoiding the risk – not starting an activity, or avoiding an area associated with the risk.
A developer may choose not to proceed with development on an area contaminated
with ERW.  Government may restrict public access to areas suspected
ALARP 
Region 
Avoiding risk Removing risk source Changing likelihood Changing consequence Sharing risk Retaining risk 
Make contaminated 
areas off limits to the 
public. 
Clear a suspected or 
confirmed hazardous 
area to a specified depth. 
Destroy an ammunition 
stockpile. 
Chemically neutralise a 
chemical agent. 
Peat fires detonate or 
burn mines in the 
ground* 
Apply render safe 
procedures to an ERW 
item before moving it. 
Provide ‘hotlines’ for the 
public to report ERW. 
Respond quickly to ERW 
reports to discourage 
‘self-help’ solutions.  
Provide civil engineering 
plant operators with ERW 
awareness training. 
Impose evacuation zones 
around sites where ERW 
has been discovered 
during EOD operations. 
Apply ‘open windows’ 
policies in the vicinity of 
an EOD task site.  
Impose restrictions on 
aircraft flight routes over 
sites where ERW work is 
underway. 
Buy public liability 
insurance. 
Include risk related 
clauses in contracts. 
Establish national liability 
policies. 
Compensation schemes. 
Leave deep buried ERW 
in place when activity will 
only affect surface or 
shallow ground. 
Informed decisions to 
leave well-managed 
stockpiles in place. 
Management inertia or 
failure to take decisions – 
leaving risk in place.* 
Choose a different route 
for a new road to avoid a 
known ERW 
contaminated area 
Erosion and dissolving of 
explosives immersed in 
water* 
Conduct desktop surveys 
prior to starting civil 
engineering work. 
Construct protective 
works around an EOD 
site. 




Humanitarian Law – 
APMBT, CCM 
Self-destruct mechanisms Provide risk education 
and training to the 
civilian population. 
Train personnel in 
appropriate SOPs. 
Impose building 
regulations in vicinity of 
stockpile 
relocate affected people 
away 
* indicates natural, environmental or ‘passive’ controls as opposed to active decision based controls.
Table 3:  examples of risk controls in mine action and MORE
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to contain ERW.  Government may choose to make certain activities illegal (such as 
in Vietnam where the collection of ERW for scrap is forbidden). 
· Removing the risk source – typically by clearing the ERW, although it is important to
recognise that it may be possible to remove the risk source from one combination of
location, contamination and activity, while leaving in place contamination that may
present a risk to a different activity at some stage in the future – a MORE example
might be the removal of shallow ERW to allow agricultural activity to take place,
while accepting that deeper buried ordnance may remain in place, but would only
present a risk if major civil engineering activities were to take place at some stage in
the future.
· Changing the likelihood – adopt procedures or policies that make it less likely that
ERW will be a problem.  Improve desktop risk assessments and provide awareness
training to plant operators for instance.
· Changing the consequences – by providing protection or by seeking to keep people
away from areas of risk.  The encroachment of civil population areas on old
ammunition storage areas may represent an increase in the consequences of an
unplanned explosion in a munition site (UEMS); moving the weapons to a more
remote storage area, or implementing more rigorous housing controls may ensure
that the consequences of an adverse event remain tolerable.
· Sharing the risk – the most widely used risk sharing mechanism is insurance,
although it is also possible to share risk through contractual terms and risk financing.
Government policy on residual liability (an important aspect of many mine action
programmes) also provides an opportunity to detail how different parties within a
MORE system share risk.
· Retaining the risk – in many cases it may be acceptable to accept the risk as it is and
‘retain’ it.  Such an approach may be entirely valid, if it based on appropriate
identification, analysis and evaluation of the risk, but it is important to ensure that
risk review takes place at appropriate intervals so that any decision to retain a risk
remains valid.
Note also that applying a risk control can create new and different risks.  In the example of 
the munition storage area suffering encroachment from populated areas, moving the 
weapons may create a new set of risks associated with the safe collection, transport and 
delivery (or disposal) of the weapons.   
MORE decision-makers need to evaluate the various risks to determine the best course of 
action and to identify any additional controls that may be appropriate in relation to new 
activities (such as transferring old weapons through populated areas). 
Tools for identifying risk treatments 
· Cause and effect analysis – to understand where there are opportunities to
influence cause and consequences/likelihood of risk;
· Bow tie analysis – to understand options for controlling risk sources, escalation
factors and consequences;
· MORE quadrant diagram – to understand how different treatments can affect risk to
different stakeholders and at different stages in the MORE system.
Managing uncertainty 
The reality is that defining MORE risks can be difficult and may only be fully accomplished 
after MORE activities have started.  The MORE risk diagram shows that a real risk only arises 
in the red zone at the centre, but circumstances often arise that may not fall directly within 
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the red zone, but which are close to it and which it will be hard to define clearly enough to 
know for sure whether risk is real or potential.  A number of well-established risk treatment 
tools (familiar from mine action programmes) are available to help address such situations: 
Locations with contamination, but no activity 
Locations that have contamination, but where no activity occurs (or is planned) are managed 
through prioritisation.  It is important to remember that in MORE risk management terms 
location is a 3-dimensional factor.  It may be that an area remote from the population has 
contamination but need not be addressed as a priority because there is no reason for people 
to go there.  Fencing, warning signs and other public information campaigns may be entirely 
adequate risk controls. 
On the other hand, it is equally possible to have a location, within a centre of population, 
where contamination is present, but is so deep that it cannot interact with normal human 
activity (it is reported that there are several large unexploded bombs below Hanoi central 
station for instance, and there are many such devices lying beneath cities like London and 
Berlin).   Only if the nature of the activity changes might it be necessary to increase the 
priority of addressing the situation. 
The situation in several European countries exhibits widespread application of this sort of 
prioritisation – deep buried ERW items are ignored unless there is a need to engage in civil 
engineering activity that might come into contact with them.  This form of ‘passive’ 
prioritisation (when contamination is ignored rather than assessed and actively prioritised) is 
a common feature of MORE systems. 
More ‘active’ prioritisation systems associated with the results of surveys or the 
development of pro-active programmes of ERW clearance are equally important as risk 
treatment tools. 
Locations, with activity, but no contamination 
It is common to encounter locations where activity is ongoing, or planned, that could 
interact with contamination, but where no contamination is actually in place (although 
people might fear that it is).  In the mine action context such situations are dealt with 
through the application of land release principles – non-technical information collection and 
analysis, limited technical investigations, and clearance only where it is shown to be 
necessary. 
The same principles apply to MORE.  The primary tool for establishing whether a location 
presents a risk is the desktop study, drawing on information from archives, museums, local 
databases and other appropriate sources.  On some occasions the results of the desktop 
study may justify technical surveys of areas, and in some places, such as many of the 
German regions, there is a mandatory requirement to conduct technical survey of land. 
Clearance only takes place when ERW items are encountered. 
The basic principle is to use evidence to support decisions about how and when to apply 
practical resources so that the minimum effort is expended to achieve overall objectives. 
Activity/contamination combinations 
It is possible to conceive of an activity which would interact with contamination, but with no 
location in the given territory where this is possible.  The risks associated with these 
circumstances are addressed through the development of appropriate policy, regulation 
and procedures. 
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A policy or law that requires mandatory technical search of all land where construction will 
take place might be appropriate in an area where there is widespread and varied 
contamination.  In areas where contamination is uncommon and of a type that is unlikely to 
interact with most activities, such a policy would be excessive and would impose large and 
unjustified costs on the construction sector.  As a result inward investment and 
development could be discouraged, depressing local economic activity causing a range of 
undesirable results. 
It is as important to ensure that policy and regulation is appropriate, targeted and 
sophisticated, as it is to ensure that technical activity is targeted at areas that justify its cost. 
All risk treatment tools rely upon the availability and analysis of valid, up-to-date data about 
ERW and its effects on society. 
Risk Review 
Circumstances change, contamination ages, economic and social aspects develop over time 
and the scale and nature of MORE capacities vary.  Successful ERW risk management 
requires review of the situation, context, identified risks and treatments, at appropriate 
intervals to ensure that the overall approach remains suitable and effective. 
Already identified risks change, new risks may be identified and the likelihood and 
consequences of every risk may be influenced by changes in the surrounding context. 
In decentralised MORE systems ERW risk reviews are rare, and typically only triggered by a 
major adverse event (such as the unexpected detonation of an ERW item in a built up area) 
or by changes in policy (such as decisions to privatise, scale down or otherwise modify the 
scale and scope of ERW response assets).  In directed MORE systems formal reviews should 
be planned in at more regular intervals, such as when new editions of strategic plans are 
developed. 
The purpose of review is to consider information about the performance of the MORE 
system and the risks that it seeks to manage (through the results of analysis of data, 
evaluations and assessments) to identify evidence to support maintenance and 
improvement of the system/programme. 
Underlying principles of successful MORE 
Communication, consultation and information management 
Effective and efficient MORE relies upon up-to-date information being easily available to 
decision-makers.  Poor, incomplete, out-of-date or inaccessible information increases 
uncertainty, makes risk management harder and is likely to result in the application of 
excessive, unnecessary or inappropriate risk controls. 
Information about ERW and responses to it should be made as widely available as possible 
and should be kept up-to-date with new information as surveys, discoveries, responses, 
accidents and incidents occur. 
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Consultation with relevant stakeholders is an essential part of MORE and should be included 
in every stage of the MORE cycle.  Consultation helps ensure that: 
· The context is appropriately established;
· The interests of stakeholders are understood and taken into account;
· ERW risks are appropriately and comprehensively identified;
· Different areas of expertise are brought together to analyse risks;
· Different views are considered when defining risk criteria and in evaluating risks;
· Endorsement and support is secured for MORE policies, plans and programmes; and
· Communication and consultation plans are appropriate.
Stakeholders make judgements based on perception of risk.  Perceptions vary depending 
upon the values, needs, assumptions and concerns of different stakeholders, as well as on 
the availability of information. 
Monitoring & review 
Although ERW contamination may remain in place for very long periods; circumstances, 
conditions, policies, priorities and other aspects of the situation change over time.  It is 
important that appropriate monitoring mechanisms are in place and that all aspects of the 
system are subject to review at appropriate intervals.    
MORE systems are often complex and extensive.  While the overall system, and the risks it 
addresses, should be reviewed in their entirety, it is also important that subordinate 
elements are also subject to their own review to make sure that both the detail and overall 
strategy of MORE continue to make sense and satisfy government, social and economic 
requirements. 
Quality management methods 
Basic principles of quality management, such as the Plan –Do – Check – Act (PDCA) continual 
improvement cycle, are directly relevant to MORE and should be used widely across the 
system, alongside the application of other quality principles such as customer focus, 
evidence based decision making, the process approach, the system approach to 
management and the involvement of people. 
Conclusion 
MORE systems are often complex and diffuse, interacting with different arms of 
government, commercial organisations and the general public.  ERW presents many 
different risks that typically change over time.  Trying to make sense of such situations can 
be difficult, but however complex the situation may appear to be, underlying simple 
principles of risk management apply to every aspect of MORE. 
The risk management cycle described in this document provides a widely applicable 
framework that MORE managers and decision-makers can use to make sense of the wider 
ERW context, their roles within it and the implications of the decisions and actions they take. 
This publication is one of several produced by the GICHD.  Users are encouraged to refer to 
the full range of publications and to seek out other relevant information about the 
management of risk on line and in hard copy. 
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i Definitions from ISO 31000:2009 Risk management – Principles and guidelines and ISO Guide 
73:2009 
ii UK Court ruling - Regina vs. Board of Trustees of the Science Museum, 1993  
iii Reducing risks, protecting people – UK HSE 2001 
iv Ibid 
GICHD Risk Management Tools - Bow Tie Analysis 
What to use the tool for 
Bow Tie analysis is useful for analysing events that may have more than one possible cause and that 
can have a range of consequences. 
How to use the tool 
The bow tie diagram can be drawn direct from a brainstorming session: 
· A risk is identified for analysis and is placed at the central knot of the bow tie.
· Risk causes (hazards in a safety context) are listed and the mechanisms by which they give
rise to the risk are discussed and described.
· Lines are drawn between each cause and the risk.
· Factors which could escalate the situation can also be included on the left hand side of the
diagram.
· Barriers, or controls, which could prevent a cause leading to the central event are identified
and represented as vertical lines cutting across the relevant cause line.
· Barriers to escalation can also be included as vertical lines in the left side of the diagram.
· On the right hand side of the diagram consequences are identified and listed, with
consequence lines leading out from the central event.
· Barriers that prevent or mitigate consequences are shown as vertical lines cutting across the
relevant consequence lines.
Benefits and limitations 
Bow tie analysis provides a simple, easy to understand diagrammatic representation of a risk, its 
causes, consequences and possible controls.  Examples of controls include the use of sandbags 
around ERW being disposed to direct the blast, and digging trenches to minimize seismic shocks to 
structural foundations. Users should be careful to ensure that it is does not oversimplify more 
complex situations.  
Example 1: Applying Bowtie Analysis in EOD operations 
Situation: 200kg aircraft bomb located in a populated 
area between 2 buildings 
Escalation Control: Place 500 sandbags around ERW 
being disposed of to direct the blast wave vertically. 
Mitigation Control: Excavate 1.5 m trench around the 
ERW to reduce seismic shocks to structural foundations 
and protect windows with 2” wood panelling (exterior) 
and blast film (interior). 
Example 2: Applying Bowtie Analysis in Risk Mapping 
Situation: According to battle records, 50% chance of 
discovering at least one 120mm artillery rocket at up to 
1 m depth during excavation of rural construction site. 
Consequence Analysis: Injury or death to machine 
operator, $40.000 damage to excavator, no other risk  
Prevention Control: Detect metal objects with a bomb 
locator on and around 6 excavation spots for building 
foundations. Cost implication: $2.500. 
GICHD Risk Management Tools – ‘PESTLE’ Analysis 
Political (including, national, regional and local governmental, institutional, etc.) 
Economic (including commercial and financial)
Social (including local communities and cultural aspects)
Technical (including operational and technological aspects)
Legal (including national, international, humanitarian and other laws, regulations, standards, etc.)
Environmental (including the natural and built environment)
What to use the tool for 
The PESTLE analysis is a highly useful tool in the realm of risk management. The approach is used to 
assist risk decision-making and can be applied as a supporting tool for discussions; a check list to help 
identify stakeholders/interested parties, and as a framework for analysing risks, influences, interests, 
implications and the effects of aspects of systems on/by those stakeholders and interested parties. 
How to use the tool 
PESTLE can be used during group meetings and to support desktop studies and other analysis of risks, 
systems, aspects and events. 
Aid memoir/check list: 
· Determine the scope of the analysis (the entirety of a MORE system; the development of a
new regulation; an individual organisation’s operations, etc.).
· Decide whether it is necessary to split the analysis into local, regional, national and
international levels.
· List stakeholders/interested parties relevant to the scope of the analysis under each PESTLE
heading.
Analysis: 
· Select one or a combination of:
o For each stakeholder/party identify how they are affected under the different
PESTLE headings.
o For each stakeholder/party identify how they exert influence under the different
PESTLE headings.
o For each stakeholder/party identify their expectations/requirements within the
scope of the analysis.
o Other questions relevant to the scope of the analysis.
Benefits and limitations 
PESTLE provides a widely applicable and easy-to-use way to identify and consider aspects across a 
broader spectrum of risks affecting the organisation than might otherwise be considered.  It helps lift 
meeting/workshop participants out of their normal comfort zone and think about the wider 
implications of actions, decisions, risk controls and so forth. 
PESTLE is focused on external environment and context and as such, is not well adapted to analysis of 
factors inside organisations.  If the scope is not well defined (and the analysis stays within the scope) 
PESTLE can become unwieldy with excessive information that is hard to analyse and understand. 
GICHD Risk Management Tools – ‘Quadrant’ Analysis 
What to use the tool for 
Quadrant analysis is used to understand how different aspects of Management of Residual Explosive 
Remnants of War (MORE) relate to each other, and to allow comparison/contrast between different 
scenarios, events or systems.  Quadrant analysis can be used to support gap analysis when comparing 
MORE systems. 
How to use the tool 
The quadrant diagram can be drawn based on input from a group of people with knowledge of the 
event, scenario or system undergoing analysis: 
· Determine the scope of the analysis (operational, legal, economic, etc., or a combination).
· Identify a core event (if applicable) and enter it into the central circle.  For generic system
analysis the event circle may be left blank.
· Identify relevant elements, aspects and/or events associated with the system, case study or
scenario undergoing analysis. Consider using the PESTLE tool to support the process of
identifying relevant aspects.
· Place each element into the relevant quadrant.
· Identify linkages between elements including feedback loops where a reactive aspect may
inform future proactive aspects.
· Compare elements within the different quadrants between countries, scenarios and case
studies as required.
Benefits and limitations 
The quadrant analysis provides a simple, common framework within which aspects of systems, 
scenarios and events can be placed, compared and their connections identified.  Comparison of 
completed quadrant diagrams with on-going analysis provides a simple, initial tool to support gap 
analysis. 
Quadrant diagrams may not be appropriate for detailed analysis of complex and dynamic systems 
with many elements and many connections. It has also limitations in presenting an accurate time-line 
for the considered elements. 
GICHD Risk Management Tools: Root Cause ‘Fishbone’ Analysis 
What to use the tool for 
Root cause analysis is used to provide a structured diagrammatic display of possible causes for an 
undesirable event or problem and to organise those causes into broad categories.  The fishbone 
diagram is also known as an Ishikawa diagram. 
How to use the tool 
The fishbone diagram can be drawn based on input from a group of people with knowledge of the 
problem that requires resolution: 
· A problem is identified for analysis and is placed in the box on the right hand side of the
diagram.
· Determine the main categories of causes associated with the problem (the illustration above
includes typical categories, but users are free to modify the list to suit their own
circumstances).
· Fill in causes for each category.
· Keep asking ‘why’ or ‘what caused that’ to drill down into causes.
· Use branches and sub-branches as necessary to illustrate the relationship between causes
and the causes of those causes.
· Review the diagram to ensure that there is consistency in the way that causes are allocated
to categories and in the way that branches and sub-branches are developed.
· Identify and highlight the most likely root causes based on discussion amongst the analysis
team members.
Benefits and limitations 
Fishbone analysis is a good way of bringing the views of a team of knowledgeable individuals together 
in a structured and readily understandable way.  It allows consideration of a wide range of possible 
causes and yields an easy to understand diagrammatic result.  The analysis can also be used to 
support pursuit of desirable outcomes/events.   
The tool relies upon the knowledge of the analysis team and may be limited in its ability to 
understand interactions between categories of causes. 
Developing Policies for Management of 
Residual Explosive Remnants of War (MORE) 
Introduction 
This guide provides information on how policy, regulation and practice develop in relation to 
Management of Residual ERW (MORE) and the functions they perform in managing the risks 
associated with ERW. 
The guide’s primary purpose is to inform planners and decision-makers at the national 
government level, but it should also be helpful to anyone who works with, or is affected by, the 
presence of ERW. 
What is MORE? 
Every conflict leaves behind it explosive remnants of war (ERW) in lesser or greater quantities 
depending upon the nature and duration of the conflict and the types and quantities of weapons 
used.  How ERW is dealt with reflects local circumstances and conditions, as well as the influence 
of international humanitarian law (IHL), the availability of resource, and prioritisation choices 
made by governments, international institutions and agencies.  In almost every case a period of 
proactive effort is followed, sooner or later, by the adoption of more reactive policies and 
practice in response to ERW.  How long after the conflict the transition from proactive to 
reactive approaches takes place, and the duration of the transition period, vary from country to 
country, but in every case a situation eventually arises when the ERW that remain are treated as 
residual.  MORE is the Management of Residual ERW.   
The MORE Risk Management Cycle 
The GICHD MORE concept addresses residual ERW from a risk management perspective.  It uses 
terminology found in the ISO series of documents including ISO 31000:2009 Risk management – 
Principles and guidelines and ISO Guide 73:2009 Risk management – Vocabulary.   
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When applied to MORE the risk management cycle consists of: 
· Understanding the MORE context
· Identifying ERW related risks
· Analysing ERW related risks
· Evaluating ERW related risks against ERW risk criteria
· Treating ERW risks
· Reviewing the efficiency and effectiveness of the MORE system to maintain confidence
and implement adjustments and improvements based on the results of monitoring and
evaluation
The MORE Risk Management Guide provides more detail on this approach and its application in 
the context of ERW.  
Understanding the context 
The context is the environment (internal and external) in which an organisation or programme 
seeks to achieve its objectives. The MORE context is a complex one.  It includes cultural, social, 
political, legal, regulatory, financial, technological, economic, natural and commercial aspects at 
the local, regional and national levels and, in some circumstances, at the international level.  It 
also includes policies, roles, accountabilities and capabilities, information systems, decision-
making processes, standards and guidelines as well as relationships with; and the perceptions 
and values of, stakeholders. 
Political aspects 
The level of political involvement in MORE depends to a great extent on the significance and 
profile of the issue within an affected country.   
In Western Europe MORE generally has a 
relatively low political profile, even though 
reports of ERW discoveries are common in 
the media (between 5 and 10 per month 
in the UK and Germany for instance). 
Politicians and legislators are not generally 
focused on the topic and it is rare for 
legislators to be presented with new laws 
specifically relating to MORE.   
Some changes in structure may be seen 
when wider political or economic events 
encourage broad changes to government 
functions. Reunification in the early 1990s 
in Germany for instance, led to some 
harmonisation of MORE systems across 
the country, although marked local 
differences remain in place and reflect the 
federal nature of Germany’s governing 
structure.    
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In the UK a move to privatise almost all aspects of ERW response reflects broader questions of 
what functions Government needs to perform during periods of financial austerity. 
In countries dealing with the effects of more recent conflicts, the structures of typical mine 
action programmes (MAPs) include more active on-going political involvement and oversight of 
operations.  In Cambodia the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) is active and engaged in 
aspects of MORE; in Germany there is no NMAA and in the UK an NMAA exists, but is focused 
exclusively on operations in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas – it has no authority to address 
questions of MORE within the UK. 
During periods of transition from MAP to MORE the questions of the role of the NMAA, and even 
whether an NMAA is required for effective MORE, become important.  Diffuse systems are often 
appropriate for MORE, and they are certainly found in countries dealing with historic ERW issues, 
but there are occasions when a more coordinated and directed approach to establishing policy 
and authority are necessary. 
Legal and regulatory aspects 
In most ERW affected countries the legal and regulatory instruments relevant to MORE consist of 
a mix of MORE-specific, and other generic laws and regulations.  The balance between specific 
and generic varies from one country to another; from the UK where there is almost no MORE-
specific legislation, but many applicable generic laws; to Germany where there are many MORE-
specific laws, regulations and requirements (at Federal and Provincial level), as well as relevant 
general legislation.i 
Officially Vietnam has not adopted a MORE approach to ERW, but in practice the country’s system 
exhibits many characteristics of a reactive MORE system than a pro-active MAP.  The general approach 
is one of pro-active search of potentially ERW contaminated areas, but search is normally triggered by 
some planned use of the land (for a road or construction).  In that sense such operations are reactive, 
responding to a need rather than a blanket plan to clear the country of all contaminated areas. 
During 2002-2004 many unexploded items of ordnance (UXO) were discovered during civilian 
construction works.  The frequency of discovery led the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to instruct 
provincial military authorities to deal with such events.  In 2005 the Police were brought into the 
system with between two and three hundred policemen undergoing Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD) training.  In reality the police rarely deal with discovered ERW, instead preferring to wait for 
provincial military specialists to arrive.   
The split of responsibility and capacity is reflected in the way that the public respond to discoveries. 
Only about 4% of discoveries are reported to the police.  The remaining 96% are reported directly to 
the provincial military1.  If physical harm to a person or people is involved the provincial or village 
health authorities are involved, but they have no direct ability to cope with ERW.  More recently Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have deployed EOD teams, especially in Hue and Quang Tri 
Provinces.   
The result is that reactive responses to discoveries now yield as many ERW items as the formal, pro-
active clearance operations.  Changes in the context (political decisions about allocation of roles and 
responsibilities; increased international engagement through NGOs; economic development driving 
new and different needs) are leading to a natural re-balancing of the system from pro-active to 
reactive MORE. 
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The approach to nationally regulating the MORE sector reflects the wider approach a society and 
government adopts to regulation – whether it tends to generic or specific legislation and 
whether there is a tendency towards direct control of particular activities or to place 
responsibility for compliance with general principles on managers and decision-makers. 
The context influences not just preferences and norms in relation to legal aspects of MORE, but 
also the applicability of national systems.  In Vietnam MORE regulations apply to all provinces 
and all operating organisations, of which the great majority are Vietnamese companies.  National 
demining companies follow Vietnamese regulations, but international NGOs are treated 
differently.  Initially the Vietnamese authorities wanted the NGOs to follow Vietnamese 
regulations, but in the end it was decided that they would be left to comply with International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 
There may also be differences in the way that compliance with regulations is checked.  For large 
ERW-related projects clients may choose to contract independent quality assurance/control 
organisations (also known as independent verification and validation (IV&V)), but these are 
relatively rare in Western Europe. No such ERW-specific contract was let in London for the 2012 
Olympic site for instance; one of the largest construction projects the UK has ever had, although 
there were extensive ERW risk assessment contracts.   
In some situations (such as Vietnam and Germany) proactive systems of inspectors are used to 
maintain confidence in activities associated with ERW.  In others (such as in the UK), a more 
reactive system is employed where the primary responsibility for addressing failures of 
compliance lies within the court system.   
It is important to be clear that all these systems work in their own way, matching local 
expectations and understanding of safety and quality, while reflecting local political, cultural and 
legal systems.  No system is perfect, and there may be opportunities for one country to learn 
useful lessons from the experience and approach of others, but policy makers need to be wary of 
mixing systems if they do not harmonise with the wider political and legal context. 
Economic and financial aspects 
MORE functions are financed in different ways, and are subject to different constraints.  In 
countries with recent or current mine action programmes ERW-related activity has typically been 
associated with a mix of international donor funding and local national finance varying from 
countries such as Cambodia where the majority of funding has been international, to Vietnam, 
where the funding continues to be overwhelmingly provided by the national Government (98% 
up to 2012). 
In most cases there is a mix of institutional and commercial funding. Lao PDR for example, has 
seen a number of large scale ERW clearance projects funded from within the energy sector, such 
as the Nam Theun Dam project.  The mix of institutional and commercial funding also varies.  In 
the UK almost all pro-active ERW search operations are commercially funded, and in Vietnam an 
increasing proportion of survey and clearance operations are commercially funded, although the 
Government continues to be a major source of funds.  Japan is funding clearance operations in 
Ha Tinh Province during 2015, and it is intended that donations from outside governments 
(including the U.S., UK, Australia and Hungary) will eventually cover around 40% of costs.  South 
Korea has also expressed willingness to fund around $30m of clearance work.ii 
Other functions within the MORE system, such as EOD response teams, have traditionally been 
provided and funded by Government agencies (normally the Ministry of Defence or Police), but 
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in some countries privatised services are increasingly used (as in the UK’s current plan to transfer 
EOD response functions from the military to civilian contractors). 
Natural environment 
Legislation relating to protection of the natural environment is endorsed, and increasingly 
enforced in many countries.  After Labour and Health and Safety Law, Environmental legislation 
is typically the next largest source of regulatory demands relevant to MORE.  Affected countries 
seeking international support are likely to find greater expectations amongst donors of effective 
and relevant legislation. 
Objectives 
The MORE context also includes the wider objectives and risk criteria associated with 
government and society.  Objectives may be governmental (keeping people safe; growing the 
economy; spending public money efficiently; encouraging commercial investments, etc.) or at 
other levels (such as making a profit on developing a new shopping centre in an area where ERW 
might be found). 
Different stakeholders have different objectives and are affected differently by the presence of 
ERW.  MORE policy makers need to balance the different needs, priorities and preferences of 
stakeholders when deciding how to allocate public money, but also to ensure that the system 
offers enough flexibility to allow stakeholders to pursue their own priorities, and expend their 
own money, when appropriate. 
National environmental legislation 
Environmental legislation in Vietnam is having an impact on how MORE activities take place:  it is now 
required that disposal of UXO is carried out at designated disposal sites, which may be some distance 
from work sites.  
Three years after construction of central disposal sites (CDS) the associated water filtration systems 
(necessary to filter TNT out of cooling and flushing water) have not been built.  Local people have 
started complaining about levels of TNT in publically available water. 
In Macedonia laws covering protection against noise in the living environment, management of waste, 
and quality of ambient air, amongst others, are all relevant to MORE. 
International environmental legislation 
A range of international legislation is relevant to MORE including: 
· The London convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
other Matters, 29 December 1972
· The 1996 Protocol to the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and other Matters (Amended 2006)
· European Union Council Directive 2006/12/EC Waste, 5 April 2006 and 2008/98/EC – that
establish and then repeal aspects of waste legislation relating to explosives
Industry Standards 
The environment is addressed within MORE-specific standards including: 
· IATG 1010:  Demilitarization and Destruction
· IMAS 10.70: Safety and Occupational Health – Protection of the Environment
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Criteria, all reasonable effort and ALARP 
Risk criteria are the ‘terms of reference against which the significance of a risk is evaluated’.iii  
Decision-makers use risk criteria to decide whether a risk matters and whether something needs 
to be done about it.   
In mine action and MORE, such criteria are often not specified in any document, but have 
evolved informally to become normal practice in most countries. For instance, any action or 
decision that leads to physical harm to a member of the public is universally regarded as 
unacceptable.  Decisions on aspects in land release processes are based upon such unwritten 
criteria, even though decision-makers may never have been presented with a written statement 
requiring them to do so. 
In Germany a failure to follow regulations, leading to harm to a member of the public, can lead 
to a jail sentence of five years or more.  In the UK the law on corporate manslaughter, as well as 
the potential for financial compensation awards, all provide criteria against which decisions 
about risk and its management are made. 
Different criteria apply to different stakeholders at different times.  The criteria a commercial 
land developer uses to decide whether a risk needs to be treated in a certain way when 
developing a shopping centre may be different from those applied by a government authority 
responsible for releasing previously contaminated land to the public, or for managing a major 
public project (such as the 2018 World Cup Football Stadium in Volgograd, Russia, where several 
unexploded bombs had already been found early in the construction process).   
Decision-makers consider the consequences that could arise (legal, economic, reputational, 
public confidence as well as physical) and decide whether, and how much, action needs to be 
taken to bring the risk to an acceptable level (that is below the risk criteria threshold). 
All MORE decisions about what action to take involve consideration of criteria, whether formal 
or informal, and whether the decision-maker does so intentionally or instinctively.  In the mine 
action sector criteria such as ‘the application of all reasonable effort’ are widely used, although 
interpretation of criteria under specific circumstances and conditions remains challenging in 
many cases.iv   
Reducing risk to a level ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) is also often encountered in 
mine action and MORE situations (see figure 1).  The concept recognises that there are risks that 
are generally accepted as being so low that no action is required to address them, and that there 
are risks that are clearly unacceptable.  In between those two, relatively straightforward 
categories, lies a range of risks and situations ranging from: 
· Further risk reduction is impracticable or the cost is grossly disproportionate to the
benefit gained; to
· The cost of risk reduction would exceed the improvement gained (in e.g. safety of public,
or a worksite)
Both ALARP and ‘all reasonable effort’ embody an important idea that at some stage further 
action cannot be justified in terms of the benefits that would accrue from the extra expenditure 
of time, resources or money.   
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MORE regulations and legislation are appropriate and proportionate when they encourage a 
response to residual ERW that meets ALARP and all reasonable effort criteria.  Legislation that 
demands actions that go beyond what is reasonable are likely to impose unnecessary and 
inefficient costs on the MORE system and stakeholders. 
In countries where direct ERW-specific regulation is more widely applied, concepts such as 
ALARP are sometimes regarded with suspicion, but it is important to recognise that similar 
thought processes are used in almost all circumstances.  Direct regulation reflects similar 
decisions about what is acceptable, what is unacceptable and how best to manage risks that fall 
between the two (acceptable and unacceptable).  The development and enforcement of 
legislation is itself a form of risk treatment reflecting assessment and evaluation of risk and the 
identification of appropriate responses. 
Figure 1:  Illustrating the ALARP concept (after ISO 31010) 
MORE Stakeholders 
A MORE stakeholder is any ‘person or organization that can affect, be affected by, or perceive 
themselves to be affected by a decision or activity’v relating to the management of residual ERW. 
The ‘architecture’ of MORE systems exhibits many similarities to the Mine Action architecture 
illustrated in the Guide to Mine Action (GICHD 2014). 
Government Arena 
The government arena includes ministries and agencies directly involved with MORE (such as the 
Ministry of Defence, Police, Army and in some cases National Guard, Civil Defence Forces, Border 
Forces and Ministry of Emergency Responses), but also those that have indirect interests (such 
as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour, Finance Ministry, Agriculture and so on). 




instances where aspects of international humanitarian law are applicable (APMBC, CCM, CCW, 
etc.). 
An important principle of MORE is that decisions taken in one part of the architecture can have 
significant knock-on effects elsewhere in the architecture.  It is important that, when developing 
MORE policy, decision-makers identify affected stakeholders and provide opportunities for their 
participation in the policy development process. 
Figure 2:  General institutional architecture for MORE 
Communities Arena 
The communities arena is often made up of those people and organisations that are most 
affected by the presence of ERW and the ways in which policy responds to that presence. 
Excessive or inflexible MORE policies and regulations typically impact upon the efficiency with 
which economic development takes place. Demanding slow and expensive search and clearance 
operations when the reality of the risk doesn’t justify them reduces developer and investor 
confidence, loads costs onto economic development projects and can result in unnecessary 
delays in the delivery of benefits to local communities. 
International Arena 
The International arena is important in those countries that draw on donor funding, or that are 
working towards compliance with applicable IHL.  In countries that are broadly self-sufficient in 
terms of MORE, the international arena may be less significant.  Nevertheless, countries with 
substantial ERW contamination, but that do not draw on international sources of funding for 
MORE, may still engage with international aspects of ERW as donors themselves, or by 
contributing to the further development of IHL. 
Market Arena 
The market arena is often of considerable importance in a MORE context.  Over time, in all ERW 
affected countries, the proportion of MORE activity funded by the private sector increases.  Oil 
and gas exploration and development (such as in the Libyan desert and on Sakhalin Island in the 
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Russian Federation) and energy projects (hydro-electric power in Laos for instance), as well as 
minerals extraction are often the earliest entrants to the MORE system. 
Over time smaller projects, backed by lower level investors, encounter ERW that has not, and 
will not, be addressed by government or international agencies.  Many commercial construction 
and development projects in European cities include investor funded ERW desktop assessments, 
as well as intrusive search work. 
Understanding the needs, expectations, preferences and interests of actors in the market arena 
is an important part of any MORE policy development process. 
MORE Arena 
The MORE arena includes those organisations and individuals that have a direct (and usually 
practical) role in MORE.  It includes those agencies that gather ERW-related information, analyse 
it, assess and evaluate risk, conduct intrusive and non-intrusive search, and deal with ERW when 
discovered. 
There may well be overlap between elements of the government and international arenas and 
the MORE arena (as when units within the police or military are directly engaged in ERW work, 
or when international NGOs have a role). 
It is also possible that elements within the different arenas may have conflicting needs, 
preferences and expectations.  Most obviously this happens when the demands of one group 
conflict with the funding available to respond, but there may be other more subtle and complex 
aspects.  It may be in the interests of some elements in the MORE arena to over-state the risks 
associated with ERW in order to secure work and jobs in the medium to long term.  Such 
situations are best addressed through basic principles of strategic planning including: 
· Information management: Gathering and analysing evidence to support valid decision-
making;
· Transparency: Making information available to all stakeholders;
· Participation: Ensure that different stakeholders are not disadvantaged by decisions
driven by other elements within the architecture.
Table 1:  Stakeholder categories in the UK and Vietnam 
Arena UK examples Vietnam Examples 
Government Arena Health & Safety Executive (HSE) 
Environment Agency 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
Police 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
External Relations 
Department 




Ministry of Labour, Invalids and 
Social Affairs (MOLISA) 
Ministry of planning and 
investment (MPI) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
Regional Military Offices 
STAMEQ 
Local Communities Arena Local Government Authorities Provincial Government Authorities 
Provincial Military Authorities 
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Mine Action Arena Commercial EOD companies Military Demining Companies 
National NGOs 
International NGOs 




National and international 
investors 




Various techniques can be used to develop comprehensive lists of stakeholders ranging from 
brainstorming to ‘onion’ diagrams, to literature reviews and search engine results.   
A wide range of tools is available to help identify, analyse and understand more clearly the roles, 






· Event case studies
Guidance on the use of these and other tools can be found in GICHD Tool Briefings. 
Evolution of context over time 
Every country where ERW is present sees changes over time in the shape and form of the MORE 
system architecture and in MORE policies, regulations and practice.  These reflect the different 
circumstances found during a period of conflict, immediately after that period, and over the 
longer term when ERW typically becomes a less significant issue. 
While all ERW-affected countries progress through a similar life cycle, the rate of progress and 
the duration of the different phases vary greatly.  In some instances (such as in France and 
Belgium) actions to deal with the residue of one conflict (WW1) are interrupted as another 
conflict (WW2) lays down new and different contamination. 
In the UK the immediate post-conflict reconstruction phase was quickly followed by a long-term 
approach to management of MORE, without the development phase found in many other 
countries.  As a result there is no ERW-specific legislation in the UK other than some detail within 
wider government Acts covering the allocation of responsibilities for ERW response to military 
units.vi  Instead the provisions of broader legislation (in particular the Health and Safety at Work 
act of 1974) are applied to ERW-related activities in the same way that they are to any other 
work activity.   
Conversely, in Germany, most parts of the country remain in a more intensive phase, when some 
pro-active work goes on as well as the more common reactive work.  A substantial body of ERW-
specific rules and regulations apply, developed at the Land (Province) level more often than 
centrally, and covering all aspects of ERW-related work including personnel qualifications, when 
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pro-active search is required, the legal status of companies and their owners and the various 
roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders. 
In countries recovering from more recent conflicts, the situation is often determined to some 
extent by the influence of international institutions (such as UN agencies) and the readiness of 
international donors to support certain types of activity.  Compliance with IHL (the APMBT and 
CCM in particular) is often a primary aim of activities during the reconstruction and development 
phases.  Indeed it may well be achieving compliance with those treaties that dictates when 
transition to long-term MORE takes placevii. 
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Phase Characteristics Policies and regulations 
Conflict Priorities are typically the immediate safety and security of people, infrastructure and 
assets, especially those contributing to the war effort. Implementation focuses on 
short-term responses.  Longer-term issues are not addressed.  ERW responses are 
confined to dealing with unexploded ordnance and are implemented by serving military 
bomb disposal specialists.  In a small number of modern conflicts a few specialist NGOs 
may seek to address aspects of UXO contamination. 
Policies are determined by wartime imperatives; 
procedures are developed on an on-going basis; few if 




Priorities are to clear up the debris and destruction of war to allow economic activity to 
start up again as quickly as possible.  ERW responses include a pro-active phase when 
known contaminated areas/locations close to populations, or on sites of immediate 
economic significance, are cleared.  Clearance programmes may be large scale with 
many people and assets involved, including both specialist and lower skilled functions. 
Programmes are directed and funded by government/international donors and include 
a mix of military and non-military personnel.  In modern situations specialist NGOs 
provide UXO related services. 
Coordination centres may be established; most 
prioritisation is carried out at the local/organisational 
level; relevant international standards may be 
adopted (in modern situations); legislation is likely to 




As the economy recovers ERW becomes less of a priority with more reactive responses, 
and fewer proactive clearance programmes.  The scale of the ERW response becomes 
progressively smaller and investors and commercial clients, rather than 
government/donors, cover more of the costs.  Commercial clearance companies are 
established and start to take on work that would previously have been addressed by 
government agencies.  There is less central direction of activity, which is more demand-
driven.  In some countries ERW responses may be influenced by the requirements of 
international humanitarian law (IHL).  As time goes on specialist NGOs wind up 
programmes or hand over assets to local organisations. 
A comprehensive regulatory environment is 
established; specific standards may (but not always 
are) established for the ERW sector; national and 
regional administrative structures are established; 
local capacities (usually non-military) are developed 
Long term ‘Passive’ 
MORE 
Eventually, proactive clearance operations become rare, the number of ERW related 
events settles at a long term level and the limited capacities to respond are confined to 
a few specialist military/police units and commercial service provision (the scale of 
which is determined by market forces).   Government wholly finances limited police 
and military resources, with commercial clients and investors paying for search 
functions only when necessary.  There is almost no [international] specialist NGO 
involvement. 
National and regional administrative structures may 
need to be wound down; resource levels are reduced; 
responsibilities are transferred to residual capacities; 
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Countries recovering from the effects of WW2 typically allowed ERW responses to evolve in 
the face of pragmatic influences and as attention moved from the after-effects of war to 
more positive aspects of recovery and peace.   
Policies and regulations were not developed as part of a coherent strategy, but grew out of a 
number of small-scale decisions reflecting local or short-term questions and situations.  In 
the UK, there was no broad governmental interest in the ERW sector, although procedural 
development took place within Amy units.  In Germany the wide range of laws and 
regulations reflect not only a cultural preference for specifying requirements, but arguably 
also some issues of commercial protectionism and the preservation of work opportunities. 
Legal and policy lag 
It is also important to be aware of the implications of legal and policy lag – when laws 
established under one set of circumstances remain in place after those circumstances have 
changed, they may demand unnecessary and inefficient MORE responses. 
The nature of the ERW task can change quite quickly, particularly during periods of 
transition; legislative systems typically operate at a slower speed.  There is reluctance to go 
through the complex processes needed to change laws, and even more reluctance to strike 
out laws and regulations that are no longer relevant.  The result is that there is a risk of 
policy/regulatory lag – when the circumstances under which laws and regulations were 
developed no longer prevail, but the laws and regulations remain in force. 
Reviews of the overall MORE system, elements within it and the policy and regulatory 
environment, are important to avoid legal/policy lag. 
Roles and responsibilities 






· Pro-active survey and search
· Re-active response and clearance
· Liability and insurance
How these different functions, and their associated roles and responsibilities, are allocated 
varies from country to country. 
Legislation is normally the responsibility of central government and the parliament – 
something that is generally common across all countries, although the type and scope of 
legislation that relates to MORE may be very different (i.e. the general health and safety 
driven approach adopted in the UK, compared with the sector specific legislation found in 
Cambodia).   
Standard setting may be compulsory or voluntary, depending on applicable laws and the 
requirements of contracts. It may arise from national and international sources including: 
· Sector-specific standards – such as IMAS, NMAS and IATGs;
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· Generic standards – such as ISO 9001, 14001 and OHSAS 18001;
· Local standard setting agencies – TüV in Germany, STAMEQ in Vietnam, etc.;
· Industry specific – UK Construction Design and management (CDM) standards
In some countries, especially those dealing with landmine problems, coordination is 
exercised from the centre and encompasses the majority of MORE related work.  In others 
coordination has, to a great extent, been devolved to the market, allowing work to take 
place as and when necessary in response to the needs of commercial, or public development 
projects.   
Similarly, prioritisation may reflect the goals and objectives of a national strategic plan, or it 
may simply be a function of need and investor budget availability. 
Checking compliance with applicable legislation may be the responsibility of specialist 
ERW/EOD inspectors (Germany, Vietnam, Cambodia etc.) or there may be other wider 
legislative instruments that encompass ERW-related activity (such as environmental and 
health and safety).  In many cases final enforcement of legislation, whether specific or 
general, comes under the remit of the court system. 
In most countries the main practical functions (search, clearance and EOD response) started 
off as exclusively military operations, but over time have become increasingly non-
governmental and/or commercial tasks.  There are examples where large-scale area search 
and clearance is undertaken by agencies of government (either military, paramilitary or 
civil), and many countries choose to leave responsibility for destruction of discovered ERW 
with the military. Yet, experience in major mine action programmes is that the majority of 
practical work is more often associated with international and national NGOS and specialist 
commercial companies. 
Decisions about how to allocate responsibility for practical MORE activities are typically 
driven by budget availability, previous practice and habit, the availability of specialist 
resources (such as NGOs) and broader trends within the mine action and ERW sector.  In 
some cases international donor funding may require that certain functions be carried out by 
non-military elements. 
Questions of liability and insurance are closely related to aspects of national legislation and 
the market arena as it includes commercial risk and insurance providers.  Government may 
choose to accept final responsibility for the consequences of ERW incidents and accidents. 
More typically, organisations working within the MORE system (whether as investors, 
developers or practitioners) are required, by law, standard and regulation, to maintain 
appropriate insurance cover in relation to staff, the general public and infrastructure. 
Once again, MORE policy-makers need to be aware of the implications of liability law and 
insurance requirements.  It may seem attractive to off-load liability onto investors and in 
some cases practitioners. But if the insurance market will not provide such cover, or will only 
do so at a price that makes MORE operational work uneconomic, then the relevant risks 
have not been properly managed, and there might be significant adverse social and 
economic consequences. 
In some cases there is little choice but for government to accept its role as final backstop in 
terms of liability and compensation.  The GICHD Guide to Liability in Mine Action provides 
further information and guidance on this important subject. 
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Information management and MORE 
Risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives.  Uncertainty is addressed through the 
provision of reliable information to help define the context and understand the various risks 
that may affect different activities.  The way in which information is collected, collated, 
analysed and made available to stakeholders has an influence on the overall MORE system 
and processes within it. 
Information about ERW is often scattered, inconsistent, held in hard copy formats or on 
occasion treated as confidential.  Getting access to information, and making sense of it, can 
be difficult for many stakeholder groups (such as commercial property developers, members 
of the general public, and even arms of government).   
In some countries the habit of secrecy amongst government agencies, especially militaries, 
and the apparently military associations of ERW (however old it may be) means that 
information is regarded as confidential. 
In the UK relevant information is held by the Ministry of Defence, the Imperial War Museum, 
local government authorities, the national archives, military unit archives, the London 
Metropolitan Archives, and a range of other less well known repositories.  In many cases 
accessing information takes time and may cost money, although a number of commercial 
service providers (such as BACTEC and Zetica), have established web portals that allow any 
interested party to gain direct access to basic collated ERW information (typically for a 
relatively small fee).viii  There is no single central database recording what search and 
clearance activity has taken place, so it can sometimes be difficult to understand whether it 
is likely that historical contamination is still in place.  
Examples of on-line rapid access to ERW risk information from British companies BACTEC and Zetica. 
In Germany each regional authority (Land) has its own system.  Most of them use local ERW 
authorities (KMBD or similar) as ‘gatekeepers’ for information, often requiring an 
explanation/justification from anyone requesting information.ix   In Berlin only parties 
planning construction or excavation work can apply for a formal response from the Office of 
the City Senate.  Additional information must be obtained through authorised EOD 
companies.  In many of the other provinces the situation is similar, although Hessen takes 
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the view that any citizen may apply for information on ERW (for a fee of €20 per 
application).  Because all work is managed through specific local authorities, search and 
clearance work is generally recorded in the archives and databases managed by the 
provincial ERW authorities. 
In Vietnam some information is publically available (such as the THOR database of US air 
strikes), but much of it is held in military and government archives where it’s dissemination 
is tightly controlled.  All search and clearance operations are carried out under the control of 
government agencies such as BOMICEN (under Engineering Command of the Vietnamese 
Army) and, in the future, VNMAC (undergoing establishment in 2015).  Much information is 
held in hard copy and no unified central database is yet in operation. 
Centralised information management systems (IMS) can be helpful in encouraging the wide 
dissemination of historical and current information, but more general policies promoting the 
public availability of information may also be beneficial.  Different ERW-affected countries 
take different views on the value of making information widely available, its implications for 
public perception of ERW risk, and in some cases the interests of the local EOD industry.  It is 
particularly important that any activity that changes the ERW situation (such as search or 
clearance) is properly recorded, and made available, to ensure that work is not repeated 
unnecessarily.x 
It is also common for gatekeeper organisations to suggest that non-specialists are poorly 
equipped to make sense of information and may reach incorrect or dangerous risk 
management decisions if they were allowed free and independent access to ERW historical 
data.  It is not clear that either approach is generally justified; certainly those places where 
information is freely available do not see any evidence of either more risky behaviour or 
unnecessarily inefficient responses.xi 
The way in which MORE information is managed influences steps throughout the risk 
management cycle: 
· Availability of information is fundamental to a valid, up-to-date understanding of
context;
· Risk identification relies upon understanding of the interaction between ERW and
various human activities.  Poor information management may lead to a lack of
awareness of some risks or lack of understanding in how they relate to different
activities;
· The analysis of risk is based upon the collection of information about ERW risks at
technical, statistical and economic levels, amongst others;
· Risk evaluation relies upon information about the nature of risk alongside an
evidence-based understanding of criteria, thresholds and other indications of public,
political and commercial risk tolerance;
· The effectiveness of risk treatment can only be assessed on the basis of evidence
showing that desired change has been effected; and
· Risk review is by its very nature a consideration of information/evidence relating to
the surrounding context and performance of the overall MORE system.
Policy and regulation as risk management tools 
A more complete explanation of risk management as applied to MORE is available in the 
GICHD Guide to MORE Risk Management. 
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The main options for treatingxii risk are: 
· Avoiding the risk by not starting or continuing with an activity that gives rise to the
risk;
· Taking or increasing a risk to pursue an opportunity;
· Removing the risk source;
· Changing the likelihood;
· Changing the consequence;
· Sharing the risk; and
· Retaining the risk by informed decision.
MORE policies and regulations can support any, or all of these forms of treatment. 
Examples of areas of influence include: 
· Forbidding certain potentially hazardous activities (avoiding risk); making some
areas off limit to public access;
· Making survey and clearance activity mandatory in some areas and before some
activities (removing the risk source);
· Requiring certain competence levels and the use of specific equipment,
methodologies and techniques (reducing the likelihood);
· Specifying the use of protective works, protective equipment, exclusion/evacuation
zones, and other physical measures (reducing the consequence or impact);
· Requiring various forms of insurance (sharing the risk); and
· Deciding, on the basis of information/evidence, that the level of risk is tolerable and
that further action is not required.
It is important to understand that applying a risk treatment can modify other risks, or create 
new ones (so deciding to remove an ERW risk source through clearance reduces an existing 
risk for the general population, but creates a new one for the clearance workers). 
Further, when a decision of ‘no further action required’ is made on a particular case or site, 
the situation should still warrant continued monitoring of the risk that might change in the 
future. If information collection and analysis are stopped, the specific awareness of the ERW 
will become outdated, in turn weakening the consequent decision-making process. 
As part of an overall MORE risk treatment strategy, authorities may wish to consider ways to 
encourage open dissemination of information about ERW contamination.  Different 
countries, and even different regions within countries, often take very different views of 
how information should be made available. 
There is no single recommended policy on ERW information, but the strategic planning 
principle of transparency is relevant.  Better access to information generally encourages 
informed and valid decision-making at every level and across MORE systems and 
discourages the inefficiencies associated with restrictive practices. 
Developing MORE Policy at the strategic level 
See also the GICHD Guide to Strategic Planning in Mine Action (GICHD 2014) and the GICHD 
MORE Transition Briefing. 
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Decisions at the MORE policy and regulatory level are strategic decisions and need to reflect 
basic principles of effective strategic planning including: 
· Transparency: Stakeholders should be aware of proposed policies and regulations
· Participation: Stakeholders should have the opportunity to contribute to discussions
and decision-making about proposed policies and regulations
· Information management: Decisions should be made on the basis of objective
evidence collected through monitoring and evaluation processes
More broadly decisions affecting one part of the MORE context may have unintended 
consequences in another part of the context.  So, for instance, a decision to make pro-active 
search compulsory prior to all civil engineering building work, may have an adverse 
economic consequence (raising construction costs) out of all proportion to the reduction in 
risk that it seeks to achieve. 
As in all strategic planning cycles it is important to ‘close the loop’ through reviews, at 
different levels within the system, and at different intervals.  It is particularly important to 
ensure that the MORE context and system are reviewed during periods of significant change, 
such as when a national programme transitions to national ownership, or when compliance 
with IHL requirements means that the scope and nature of work changes.  These are times 
when policy and legal lag can create the most inefficiency and when application of broad 
strategic planning principles is particularly important.  
In any case, reviews should be encouraged (or even mandated) within significant parts of 
the MORE architecture, within central government, individual agencies and ministries with 
responsibility for MORE activity and policy, and amongst those organisations that deal with 
ERW most directly. 
Check List 
MORE check lists are provided to help decision-makers and policy-developers assess the 
situation in their own areas of responsibility and identify actions that may help improve the 
performance of their MORE systems. 
· Is there an up-to-date list of MORE stakeholders?
· Based on an analysis of MORE stakeholders is there appropriate participation at the
MORE policy level?
· Is there an up-to-date and accurate analysis of the MORE context?
· How easy is it to get access to ERW/MORE information?
· Is up-to-date data available to support statistical analysis of ERW risks?
· Are MORE information management policies and systems fit for purpose?
· Are ERW risk criteria understood, defined and agreed by relevant stakeholders?
· Is there evidence of legal/policy lag?
· How is the overall MORE system and elements within it reviewed?  How often and
who by?
Tools 
The following simple and readily available tools are recommended for use by those charged 
with developing and reviewing MORE systems, policies and regulations. 
· MORE architecture diagram
· PESTLE
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· Stakeholder power/interest grids
· Stakeholder ‘Onion’ charts
· Event case studies
· MORE Quadrant analysis
i See Attachment A – UK MORE legislation summary 
ii Figures from interview with Senior Colonel Tuan and analysis of financial figures by Ted Patterson of
GICHD 
iii ISO Guide 73:2009, definition 3.3.1.3 and ISO 31000:2009 2.22 
iv IMAS 07.11 Land Release provides additional explanation about the meaning and achievement of
‘all reasonable effort’ in mine action. 
v ISO Guide 73:2009, definition 3.2.1.1 
vi Including a range of activities falling under the heading of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities
(MACA). 
vii Such as in Mozambique in 2014 as compliance with the requirements of the APMBT leads to a
fundamental change in approach and the adoption of MORE Strategy. 
viii http://www.bactec.com/bomb-risk.htm and http://www.zetica.com/uxb_downloads.htm   
ix In most provinces the ERW authority is the KMBD, although there are some local variations – in the
Rhineland-Palatinate for instance the local authority is the KMRD, and in Thuringia there is only a list 
of authorized EOD companies under the provincial authority. 
x In mine action programmes (MAPs), this principle is well understood, even if not always rigorously
applied.  The same is not always the case in MORE situations, especially in those that place 
responsibility on land owners/developers, rather than central authorities. 
xi  Many of the German Lands control access to historical information through ‘gatekeeper’
organisations that require an explanation as to why access to the information is required.  A few 
make information freely available (on payment of a small administrative fee).   
xii Risk treatment is defined as a ‘process to modify risk’ (ISO Guide 73:2009, definition 3.8.1).  Risk
treatments that deal with negative consequences are sometimes referred to as ‘risk mitigation’, ‘risk 
elimination’ and ‘risk reduction’. 
An introduction to Ageing of Munitions in 
the Context of Residual ERW 
Readers should note that the technical investigation of weapons is a complex and potentially 
highly dangerous activity that should only be carried out by competent specialists. It is not a 
task even for the typical EOD operator, but should be conducted only by those with extensive 
relevant experience, after careful preparation and following a thorough analysis of the risks 
involved. 
What is MORE? 
Explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
Every conflict leaves behind explosive remnants of war (ERW) in lesser or greater quantities 
depending upon the nature and duration of the conflict and the types and quantities of 
weapons used.  How ERW is dealt with reflects local circumstances and conditions, as well as 
the influence of international humanitarian law (IHL), the availability of resources, and 
prioritisation choices made by governments, international institutions and agencies.   
Residual ERW 
In almost every case an initial period of proactive effort is followed, sooner or later, by the 
adoption of more reactive policies and practices.  The duration of the transition period varies 
from country to country, but in every case a situation eventually arises when the ERW that 
remain are treated as ‘residual’.   
MORE is the Management of Residual ERW.  
The MORE Risk Management Cycle 
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The GICHD MORE project addresses residual ERW from a risk management perspective.  It uses 
terminology found in the ISO series of documents including ISO 31000:2009 Risk management 
– Principles and guidelines and ISO Guide 73:2009 Risk management – Vocabulary.
When applied to MORE the risk management cycle consists of: 
· Understanding the MORE context
· Identifying ERW related risks
· Analysing ERW related risks
· Evaluating ERW related risks against ERW risk criteria
· Treating ERW risks
· Reviewing the efficiency and effectiveness of the MORE system to maintain confidence
and implement adjustments and improvements based on the results of monitoring and
evaluation
The MORE Risk Management Guide provides more detail on this approach and its application in 
the context of ERW.  
Ageing and MORE 
Understanding the ageing of munitions is directly relevant to the identification and analysis of 
risks and to the development of appropriate and effective risk treatment. 
All weapons are designed to function in a certain way.  The way they are manufactured, stored, 
deployed and used all influence their reliability, safety and the associated risks.  Weapons that 
are abandoned, or that fail to function properly when used, exist in a condition that may be 
significantly different from that expected by their designers.  Over time the effects of ageing 
change components within weapons and influence the risks they pose. 
MORE relies upon identification, assessment, analysis and effective management of the risks 
associated with ERW of all types.  Understanding ageing is central to understanding and 
controlling the risks associated with ERW over extended periods. 
Weapon ageing is a complex and highly technical subject.  This briefing paper sets out some of 
the basic principles and implications of ageing.  It provides examples of different weapon types 
and the influences of diverse histories and environments.  It does not go into detail about the 
numerous mechanisms of ageing, nor does it include technical analysis of individual weapon 
types.  Readers who would like to discover more about the fine detail of ageing of specific 
weapon types are recommended to refer to individual technical reports, some of which are 
available through the GICHD. 
The MORE risk management approach seeks to 
understand the reality of risks presented by ERW. 
A real ERW risk exists when three associated 
factors combine:  ERW contamination must be 
present at a location where activity (capable of 
interacting with the contamination) is taking place, 
or will take place. 
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Situations where only one or two factors are present do not present a risk (at least not at the 
current time and space), even though perception of risk might be present. 
Risk is defined as ‘the effect of uncertainty on objectives’.i  Uncertainty is managed through the 
collection and analysis of information about circumstances, contexts and the detail of specific 
weapons, locations and activities. 
The study of ageing relates especially to the interaction between weapons contamination and 
human activity.  A risk only arises when an activity has the potential to interact, in a hazardous 
way, with the specific type, or types, of contamination at a location.  The potential for 
interaction depends upon both the nature of the activity and the condition of the 
contamination.  Over time the sensitivity of weapons to different types of external stimulus 
changes, and the ability of the weapon to function as designed alters, implying changes to both 
the probability of initiation and the consequences of a detonation. 
Purpose of ageing analysis 
Ageing analysis helps inform: 
· Understanding of the likelihood and consequences of weapons functioning;
· Operational procedures (including survey and clearance);
· Risk assessments and safety policies.
· High level MORE policies.
Ageing mechanism and effects 
Ageing affects every component of a weapon (its exterior, structure and internal mechanisms 
and parts), but the significance and speed with which those effects become apparent varies 
greatly between components and under different external influences.  On-going technical 
research projects seek to improve understanding of ageing influences and effects. 
Every weapon is designed around a sequence of component interactions and events leading to 
a release of energy.  For the purposes of MORE the final release of energy generally consists of 
a detonation of explosive material, sometimes relying upon blast for its effects, sometimes 
using shrapnel, shaped charges or projectiles to cause harm.  Other less common weapons may 
make use of chemicals, biological or radiological agents or other materials to cause harm or 
damage.   
In every case the weapon was designed to function in a certain way.  The individual history of 
each weapon influences whether it can function as designed and, if it cannot or fails to do so, 
how hazardous it remains. 
ERW timeline and history 
Figure 1 illustrates a simplified generic life history of a typical weapon.  It is manufactured, 
distributed to the military client, stored, deployed to field units and prepared for use/armed. 
Finally the weapon is initiated (through some triggering mechanism or influence) before 
running through a sequence of increasingly explosive events leading finally to a detonation of 
its main explosive charge and the delivery of effects onto its surroundings. 
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Individual weapons may be more or less complex by design and experience different histories, 
including repeated storage and deployment phases for instance, but all weapon histories 
exhibit similar general steps and stages.   
In many cases weapons never proceed through the full history, but may remain in stockpiles, 
be abandoned (AXO) at a storage or deployment stage, or may be deployed and used, but fail 
to function (UXO). 
Figure 1:  Different possible pathways from a weapon manufacture to a final status.  Stockpiles generally remain 
under some form of control, whereas AXO is no longer under any form of management.  Some substantial 
stockpiles may eventually be abandoned (as happened at the end of the Second Gulf War and in Libya).  
Irrespective of their ‘managed’ status, some stockpiles may present significant risks to surrounding populations 
and can be highly influenced by ageing issues.ii 
What happens during each step in the history directly influences the risks presented by 
weapons to people, infrastructure and other elements of the surrounding environment.  This 
briefing does not focus in detail on questions of design and manufacture of weapons, but the 
quality of both the design and manufacturing process are relevant to the risks associated with a 
weapon.iii   
The actual history of a weapon, or collection of weapons, may be highly complex involving sale 
and transfer between several countries; exposure to a range of different environmental 
conditions; quality of its upkeep and management during various stages of handling, 
maintenance, transport and storage; and a loss of records along the way. 
Figure 2:  Weapons of the same type (Russian S24 air launched ground attack rockets) and age, from the same 
stockpile.  The weapons on the right appear to have been subject to high temperatures, perhaps during a bush 
fire.  The risk implications of the apparently different histories on the two groups of weapons are uncertain.  
Note that these weapons are not abandoned (AXO), but are in a stockpile under (limited) management. 
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In general all weapons are designed to be safe when properly stored and to be dangerous only 
when employed against their targets, but how safe they really are varies.  Weapons designed 
during peacetime may benefit from longer periods of research and development; they may 
make use of more complex safety and arming systems.  Conversely, weapons designed under 
conditions of urgency in wartime may do away with some aspects of safety systems.   
How a weapon is stored is of importance to ageing.  Equally the ways that weapons are 
designed to be deployed and armed is important for understanding the risks they present 
should they fail to function. Arming of weapons for one is done either through a manual 
(mechanical, mechanical/inertia or mechanical/chemical) process, or as part of an automatic 
(electric/chemical, electronic, pneumatic or hydraulic) system. Simply put; a weapon that still 
has a safety pin in place presents different risks to one fully armed. 
Figure 3: simplified weapon history diagram 
The design functioning sequence of a weapon is paramount in terms of the likelihood that it 
will function as intended by its designer, but also in terms of understanding how different 
human activities could potentially interact with the weapon to cause it to explode. 
The condition (physical state compared to its ‘as new’ condition) and status (whether it is 
complete, armed, fuzed etc.) of a weapon also relate to its susceptibility to the effects of 
ageing, the likelihood that it will function and the potential consequences should it do so.iv 
Weapon storage history 
Ageing is important in relation to UXO and AXO, but even stored weapons in stockpiles can be 
subject to significant ageing depending on the conditions under which they have been kept. 
Figure 4 shows British-made BL755 submunitions from the stockpile of one country (Serbia). 
The weapons were manufactured in the UK and are all of a similar age, but local flooding at the 
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storage facility meant that weapons on the lower levels of storage were immersed in water for 
an extended period while others remained dry.   
The consequences are clearly visible.  Weapons that remained dry are in good condition, 
making them easy to handle and process (during demilitarisation for instance).  Those that 
were immersed in water suffered significant corrosion are difficult to handle and process and 
may present different risks. 
Figure 4: BL755 cluster bomb submunitions of the same age from the same stockpile. Some (on the left) have been 
kept dry and remain in good condition; others (on the right) were subject to flooding and suffered severe 
corrosion. 
Deployment and arming 
Weapons are deployed in different ways – they may be thrown, fired, dropped or laid for 
instance.  Equally they are armed in different ways – by withdrawing a safety pin; following an 
electronic or clockwork time delay; as a result of aerodynamic force acting on a small propeller 
on the nose of a bomb; as few examples amongst many different mechanisms.  More complex 
weapons make use of several steps in the arming process and involve mechanical and electrical 
components, while others have only one step (removing the safety clip from an M14 Anti-
Personnel landmine for instance). 
Ageing directly influences arming processes, reducing the ability of mechanical components to 
perform their design functions and reducing the ability of electrical components to conduct 
electricity or retain charge.v 
In the Russian PTAB 2.5M submunition, arming relies upon aerodynamic force turning an 
impeller on the nose of the weapon as it falls through the air after release from its cluster 
7 
munition canister.  This in turn allows other components to move within the fuze until the 
detonator is released, to swing into its correct position, under the pressure of a small spring. 
Technical investigation has shown that, in weapons stored in the open air and subject to wet 
conditions, a significant proportion of the tiny springs that move the detonator into the armed 
position have corroded and failed; such weapons are very unlikely to function as designed.   
Initiation and detonation 
When a weapon functions it relies upon a triggering mechanism to initiate a firing sequence. 
Triggering influences include: 
· Kinetic energy/impact (e.g. when a bomb impacts on the ground);
· Pressure (e.g. on a landmine);
· Electronic signals (e.g. radar determining that a cluster bomb is the right height above
the ground to deploy its submunitions);
· Magnetic influence (e.g. various maritime weapons and some landmines);vi
· Time (e.g. area denial submunitions);
· Sound and vibration (e.g. geophones);vii and
· Human command (e.g. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), ‘Claymore’ type landmines,
etc.).
Once the sequence has been initiated a series of increasingly energetic steps lead to eventual 
detonation of the main charge.  For the sequence to work in its entirety, leading to detonation 
of the weapon as designed, each step must occur and must do so with sufficient effect to 
trigger the next step in the process. 
In some weapons (such as cluster munitions) complex sequences may be involved, sometimes 
including two or more sequential processes.  The first leads through a series of steps to 
dispersal of submunitions, then each individual submunition has its own separate sequence 
leading to the final attack function. 
Each step requires input energy from the previous step and each step must then deliver 
enough energy to the next step for the sequence to continue.  As energetic components age 
they may require more energy from the previous step (meaning that they become less 
sensitive) or they may require less energy (they become more sensitive, although this is 
relatively rare).viii  At the same time their ability to deliver energy onwards in the firing 
sequence may also be compromised. 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the basic principles of the energy ‘transactions’ in a firing sequence. 
Figure 5 shows a firing sequence ‘as designed’ – each step has the ability to deliver enough 
energy to initiate the nest step and so on through the entire sequence until finally the main 
charge detonates. 
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Figure 5:  A weapon functioning as designed.  In each step the energy delivered (green) exceeds the energy 
demanded (red) by the next step. 
Figure 6 shows a compromised situation.  In this case ageing has had an effect on two 
components.  The condition of the material in step 1 (a stab receptor for instance) has 
changed.  It no longer has the ability to generate as much energy as it did when it was first 
manufactured.  It may still function, but with much less of a release of energy than it was 
designed to yield.   
At the same time the condition of the material in step 2 (a booster charge for instance) has also 
changed. It now needs more energy than when it was designed and manufactured in order to 
function.  There is an imbalance in the system.  Even if step 1 proceeded, step 2 will not and 
the firing sequence will stop without the main charge detonating. 
Figure 6:  Ageing has reduced the ability of Step 1 to deliver energy and increased the energy demanded by Step 2.  
Step 2 now demands more energy than Step 1 can deliver.  The weapon will no longer function as designed, even 
though the ability of Step 2 to deliver energy to Step 3 remains unaffected. 
It is also possible to envisage circumstances in which the opposite occurs.  One of the steps 
requires less energy to function, making the weapon more sensitive and potentially more 
dangerous to people.  There are circumstances where this can happen (even leading to auto-
initiation on rare occasions), but evidence suggests that it is overwhelmingly more likely that 
most weapons become less sensitive over time.ix 
The illustrations above describe changes to a complete weapon in its design deployment 
configuration (such as a deployed landmine for instance).  MORE situations typically deal with 
weapons that are not in such a condition, but that have already deviated in some way from the 
circumstances that their designers expected – these include weapons that have been dropped 
or fired, but which have failed to function for some reason (UXO) as well as material that was 
abandoned before it was armed and prepared for use (AXO). 
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Figure 7:  A disassembled Italian SB33 anti-personnel landmine showing the results of an age-weakened 
detonator that functioned, but failed to initiate the main charge. 
UXO and AXO are susceptible to the same principles described above.  In order for any weapon 
to detonate (and deliver harm to people or assets) energy must be introduced into the system 
in such a way that the firing sequence proceeds.   
Figure 5 illustrates the situation in an item of AXO where step 1 of the design firing process is 
not present (the weapon is unfuzed for instance).  The weapon still has the potential to 
detonate, but it can only do so if some alternative (external) energy input is provided in such a 
way that the remainder of the firing sequence proceeds to main charge detonation. 
Figure 8:  AXO without Step 1 in place requires an external energy input direct to Step 2 to initiate the remaining 
firing sequence.  Note that the energy demanded by Step 2 is typically greater than that required to start the 
firing process at Step 1. 
Normally the early steps in a firing sequence are relatively sensitive, while those later in the 
process require more energy to continue the sequence.  Weapons in which the early steps are 
not present are likely to require relatively greater energy inputs (larger than those required by 
the weapon in its intended armed state) to initiate those parts of the firing sequence that 
remain in place. 
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A range of potential energy sources can be considered including: 
· Kinetic (e.g. dropping or hitting the weapon)
· Thermal (e.g. fire, friction, intense solar)
· Electrical (e.g. static, RF)
· Chemical
· Pressure
· Shock (e.g. sympathetic detonation)
A risk only arises when an activity has the potential to deliver enough energy of the right type 
(or types) to specific components in the weapons that are present at the location (and depth) 
where activity will take place.   Ageing influences the susceptibility of a weapon to different 
types and quantities of energy and, by extension, to the potential for different types of human 
activity to deliver such energy. 
Ageing mechanisms 
All materials exhibit physical characteristics relating to their mechanical, electrical and chemical 
properties (as well as other characteristics such as radioactivity that may be important in some 
circumstances, but that are not addressed in this briefing).x 
Over time all such characteristics change - some slowly, others more quickly.  Some of the most 
important changes in relation to ERW include: 
· Mechanical properties – materials may lose their elasticity (leading to springs that no
longer store energy) or become brittle (resulting in cracking in components).
· Electrical properties – capacitors lose stored charge (making them unable to deliver
energy when required), resistance increases in wires (increasing the energy
requirement in the system).
· Chemical properties – energetic material may become less (or more) sensitive changing
the energy demanded by steps in the firing sequence; energetic material may become
less explosive changing the amount of energy delivered to subsequent steps; other
components (such as rocket propellants) may become increasingly hazardous even
though they were relatively safe when first manufactured.
In practice changes in the different properties interact with, and often reinforce, changes in 
other properties.  Hence a chemical change such as rusting changes the mechanical and 
electrical properties of a component and may eventually lead to the complete decay and 
disappearance of some components. 
Figure 9:  PMN from Cambodia showing cracked and damaged rubber external casing and rusted striker spring 
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Similarly a change in the properties of a casing material (rubber or plastic) may lead to cracks 
and holes, allowing water to enter a weapon, accelerating changes in other components. 
In some cases (particularly when liquid water or excess humidity are present) different 
materials within the weapon may (electrolytically) react together causing corrosion, short 
circuits and other effects. 
Ageing is a dynamic system.  Changes in one factor may lead to changes in other factors that 
feedback to further influence changes in the first factor.  Modelling of such systems helps 
understanding of the different influences at work in ageing processes and identification of 
linkages between influences, but the lack of detailed technical, scientific and statistical data 
about how properties change over time currently limits the conclusions that can be reached 
through such analysis.xi 
Changes to mechanical and structural components (springs, pins, casings etc.) are generally 
better understood than the effects of ageing on energetic (explosive) materials.  This is partly 
because many other industries (such as automotive and aviation manufacturers) have devoted 
a great deal of time and attention to investigating how materials age and respond to different 
environmental conditions.  Not all such conclusions naturally and completely read across to 
components of weapons, but there are many relevant parallels that can inform MORE technical 
risk assessment and ageing investigations.   
Information on the ageing of explosives is harder to come by.  There is plenty of anecdotal 
material in relation to UXO from the two world wars, but much of the harder data is held in 
difficult-to-access databases, archives and libraries.  More effort is required to encourage 
sharing of existing information and the collection and analysis of new information.  The MORE 
project includes technical investigation (ammunition exploitation) work helping to address gaps 
in ageing knowledge. 
Environmental influences 
The ageing of components in weapons (both inert and energetic) is strongly influenced by 
environmental factors including: 
· Water – whether in moisture or fluid form, is one of the most significant accelerators of
ageing in weapons.  Water related affects are significantly accelerated if the water is
saline;
· Temperature (and temperature cycles) – thermal expansion and contraction create
movement within and between components.  When combined with the presence of
water temperature ranges can lead to freeze/thaw cycles;
· UV light – many materials, especially plastics, are susceptible to the effects of UV light
– leading to materials becoming brittle, rubbers perishing and components cracking,
breaking and even disappearing altogether;
· Soil type – the pH value can accelerate (or reduce) the rate of some chemical reactions
and changes within the weapon.
Other factors, such as the presence and type of vegetation as well as biological processes, can 
also be important to ageing processes under some circumstances.  
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Vulnerability and hazard analysis 
How a weapon is designed and constructed and the materials that it contains, together 
determine how vulnerable that weapon is to the effects of ageing.  Highly vulnerable weapons 
are likely to age more quickly than those less vulnerable.   
Vulnerability analysis allows weapons to be ranked in order of their vulnerability to ageing.  The 
analysis takes into account: 
· The materials used in the weapon;
· The susceptibility of those materials to changes as they age;
· The complexity of the weapon as a system; and
· To a limited extent, the interaction of different materials within the system.
A vulnerability index is a semi-quantitative measure that can be used to compare the 
vulnerability of different weapon types to ageing.xii   
Hazard indices can also be developed reflecting the risk presented by different weapons 
including: 
· The sensitivity of the weapon’s initiation system; and
· The scale, scope and form of the harm it can deliver.
The relationship between vulnerability and hazard can be described as: 
Hf = Hi f (V, E, t) 
Where Hf (the final hazard index), is dictated by Hi (the initial hazard index) and a function of V 
(the weapon’s vulnerability index), E (environmental factors) and t (the elapsed time between 
initial and final time). 
While detailed factors cannot yet be fully quantified in every respect, there are clear principles 
that can be considered such as the fact that sea water represents a more significant 
environmental ageing factor than fresh water; the presence of which is itself more significant 
than dry conditions. 
Ageing is not yet understood to the extent that allows detailed predictions about the condition 
of individual weapons and the risks they are likely to present at specific times and in specific 
locations. However, valuable general observations can be made on the likely effects of ageing 
on different weapon types under different circumstances and conditions.  In particular a 
munition ageing analysis can highlight aspects of weapons that are relevant to any risk 
assessment and to identify areas that would merit further data collection and research. 
The findings of a munition ageing analysis should lead to a review of standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) and affect broader project/programme policies. 
Current understanding of ageing 
Understanding of ageing, and its implications for risk management, relies upon two basic 
approaches to the collection and use of information: technical assessments usually carried out 
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through the disassembly and detailed investigation of a weapon and its components; and 
statistical methods that look at bulk data to assess the likelihood and consequences of adverse 
events. 
To date most ageing and risk analysis research has focused on detailed technical investigation 
of individual weapon examples, to inspect the condition of components and to test the 
functionality of key energetic parts.  The evidence from such investigations suggests strongly 
that the effects of ageing are generally to make weapons safer and less sensitive over time.   
There are some (relatively rare) weapon types where this may not be the case, temporarily, but 
eventually all weapons deteriorate to an extent where they can no longer function (even 
though that may take a very long time).  There may also be periods when some components in 
more common weapons become more sensitive, but once again the evidence is that this is 
relatively rare and in effect for a limited duration, and that the overall trend is towards a lower 
risk. 
Statistical methods have been used to a much lesser extent, mostly for want of valid data in 
quantities sufficient to yield meaningful results.  In general terms, the ageing of ‘populations’ of 
different weapon types exhibit similarities to aspects of ageing in human populations.  Both 
situations lend themselves to statistical analysis, but whereas there is a great body of data 
relating to human health, there is very little available in relation to the condition of different 
types of weapons. 
The lack of data imposes serious constraints on opportunities for analysis and the value of 
conclusions that can be reached about ageing and the general risks presented by different 
weapon types.  Field operators are encouraged to provide more data about the condition of 
weapons that are discovered during survey, clearance and EOD operations - International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS) now require field operators to record and report the external visible 
condition of every item of ERW or UXO that they find, but so far relatively little information has 
been collected.xiii 
Until more field data become available, ageing analysis is limited to the establishment of basic 
principles of ageing and the key mechanisms leading to changes in the physical characteristics 
of weapon components.  Such understanding is valuable, but represents the tip of the iceberg 
in terms of the potential value for MORE (as well as for Mine Action and Ammunition Safety 
and Stockpile Management) in the future. 
Policy implications 
The potential for a given weapon to interact with human activities is a fundamental part of the 
MORE risk assessment process.  A policy that assumes potential for interaction, when such 
potential does not in fact exist, is inappropriate and inefficient. Lack of knowledge (information 
and understanding) leads to uncertainty and poor risk management. Conversely, decision-
making and policy-development based on facts are likely to be appropriate, well targeted and 
efficient. 
Identifying risks 
Technical ageing analysis on munitions helps risk managers identify a wide range of potential 
risks including: 
· Main explosive charge risks: For a weapon to present a full explosive risk to people
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there must be a mechanism whereby enough energy can be delivered to relevant 
components within the weapon to initiate and sustain the firing train, noting that the 
energy does not have to be delivered to the first, or earliest, step in the firing train; but 
it does need adequate energy of the right type, to start a sequence that runs through 
to detonation of the main charge. 
· Partial explosive risks: It may also be possible for a small explosive component to
function, or for a major component to function fully, presenting a lesser hazard to
people, without the firing sequence proceeding through to full detonation of the main
charge.
· Other risks: Direct risks, such as injury when attempting to move a heavy weapon, or
injury by release of heavy duty springs that store energy (e.g. for parachute ejection
when handling a weapon; and indirect risks to health and environment such as when
explosive is washed out of a weapon and exposed to human body or mixed into
drinking water.
Analysing risks 
Risk analysis is the process of comprehending the nature of risk and determining the level of 
risk.xiv  Ageing analysis is essential to comprehending the nature of the risk presented by 
different weapon types, and how that risk changes over time.  It is also important to 
understand the level of risk associated with the potential interaction between different types 
of weapon and human activities. 
Central to analysis of ERW risks are the pre-requisites for a weapon to function: Delivery of the 
right type and quantity of energy to the weapon (and to specific components within) if it is to 
initiate and detonate.  Technical risk analysis starts from a thorough description of the 
components, processes and mechanisms within each weapon type and an understanding of the 
sensitivity of those components and processes to different energy inputs.  If there is no 
pathway for energy to be delivered to the weapon, then there is no risk that it will initiate. 
Statistical analysis relies upon the availability of suitable data in quantities (samples) sufficient 
for valid analysis. It allows for assessment of the likelihood of different events occurring, and 
may be able to provide indications of typical consequences (casualty numbers and types and 
damage levels) associated with certain events.  Statistical analysis also helps investigate the 
effectiveness of risk treatments once they have been implemented. 
Developing risk treatments 
Risk treatments are measures that modify risk.  They do so through avoiding risk, reducing the 
likelihood or consequences of an adverse risk, sharing risk or removing its source.  Studying 
ageing in munitions helps significantly in understanding how: 
· Activities can be modified to reduce the chances of delivering energy that might initiate
a firing sequence in ERW;
· Ageing changes the likelihood that a weapon will function under different
circumstances and in association with human activities;
· Ageing affects the ability of a weapon to function fully and create adverse
consequences;
Risk treatments succeed when they change the way in which human activity interacts with 




ERW risks change over time.  Activities at different locations change and the condition of the 
ERW changes as it ages.  Risk reviews should be informed by the results of ageing analysis and 
assessment of the implications for changes in the hazards associated with different weapons. 
Future action check list 
While basic mechanisms of ageing are relatively well understood, the detail is hard to come by. 
Specifically, how different weapons age, and the way in which environmental factors affect 
ageing rates, have little available data for research.  The single most important action that can 
be taken to help address shortfalls in understanding ageing and its implications for ERW risk is 
to collect reliable data and make that data widely available. 
National authorities, government agencies, military and civil authorities and operating 
organisations can all make contributions to improved understanding of ageing and risk by 
making relevant historical data available to researchers; 
· Conflict history and bombing data
· What ERW was discovered, when and where during response operations (by military,
NGO etc.)
· Accident and incident data when ERW resulted in injury, death and/or damage to
property
· Establishing policies and procedures to ensure that comprehensive data is collected
whenever weapons are discovered now and in the future, or when an accident or
incident occurs.
· Consider establishing technical investigation programmes using specialist technicians,
suitable testing facilities, scientific research agencies and recovered munitions (noting
the importance that this sort of work be done in the realm of a comprehensive safety
management system).
· Sharing information between agencies, institutions, countries and other interested
parties.
i Definition from ISO 31000:2009 Risk management – Principles and guidelines and ISO Guide 73:2009 
ii The problem of unplanned explosions in munitions stores (UEMS) is primarily a problem of stockpiles
that are poorly managed, rather than abandoned.  See the Small Arms Survey (SAS) guide to UEMS for 
more information on this important topic - http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-
markets/stockpiles/unplanned-explosions-at-munitions-sites.html.  
iii The M93 mortar cluster bomb, manufactured in Yugoslavia, contains a dispersal mechanism adapted
from the fly-off lever on a hand grenade, with submunitions that have a single step arming process (most 
other similar weapons have a multi-step process), creating problems during demilitarization operations 
for instance. 
iv This briefing focuses on the consequences of a weapon detonating, but there is potential for ageing
munitions to have other consequences for the environment and human health, if toxic substances 
contaminate soil that is used for agriculture, or water that is used for drinking.  Some scientific research 
work has been carried out on ERW from a toxicity perspective looking at issues of dose levels and 
potential pathways to human ingestion, inhalation etc.  See www.toxicremnantsofwar.info for further 
information. 
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v Other systems make use of chemical reactions to arm or initiate weapons; these are also susceptible to
the effects of ageing. 
vi Many torpedoes are designed to ‘miss’ their target by a small distance, using a magnetic influence fuze
to detect when the weapon is beneath its target.  The shock wave that results from the explosion of the 
main charge is used, as it moves through the water, to increase the effects of the weapon on its target.  
Similarly many sea mines are laid on the sea bed and rely upon detecting the magnetic field of a passing 
vessel to initiate their detonation sequence.  Further complexities may be included such as time delays 
and counters that wait until a certain number of magnetic signals have been detected before the 
weapon functions. 
vii The Russian VP12 and 13 control system, used in conjunction with a range of landmines, includes an
option to use geophones to detect human footsteps (and to some extent to filter out non-human 
footsteps or other vibrations).  Some underwater systems are sophisticated enough to be able to identify 
one individual ship from another, so ensuring that only the specific target vessel is attacked by the 
weapon. 
viii  Energetic components are those that contain compounds capable of igniting or exploding.
Conversely, inert components are those that are purely mechanical in nature.  Inert components can still 
present hazards to people, such as when a powerful spring-loaded component deploys suddenly. 
ix In Germany some chemical fuzes used by the UK and US air forces during WW2 are notoriously
unpredictable and there is evidence to suggest that they are the cause of a small number of unexplained 
and apparently autonomous detonations.  In Vietnam UXO reported to be associated with a purple fuze 
is also associated with apparently autonomous explosions.  It is hoped that technical research will be 
possible to understand more clearly the processes at work in these instances. 
x Materials and their properties is a huge area of scientific and technical information and research.  This
briefing focuses on a small number of properties of particular interest.  Future detailed investigation of 
ageing may need to look in more detail at aspects of acoustic, atomic, magnetic, optical, radiological and 
thermal properties amongst others. 
xi See the Study into the Ageing of Landmines, conducted by James Madison University and C King
Associates Ltd in a US State Department funded project, for details of a simple dynamic model for the 
PMN anti-personnel landmine. 
xii ISO 31010 contains details of a wide variety of risk identification, analysis and evaluation tools
including the use of risk indices.  It also provides guidance on how to use different tools, when they are 
most suitable, and the strengths and weaknesses associated with each one. 
xiii IMAS 07.11 Land Release – minimum data collection requirements.  
xiv Definition from ISO 31000:2009 Risk management – Principles and guidelines and ISO Guide 73:2009 
Economic analysis for MORE 
Summary 





of  the  MORE  project  is  to  assist  national  authorities  in  developing  systems  and  tools  that  will 
promote and enable evidence based approaches to addressing the residual risk posed by ERW, once 
all reasonable effort has been taken to complete survey and clearance in a post conflict country. 
Programmes  in any  field need  to be able  to demonstrate  they are delivering value‐for‐money. For 















The  foundational principles of MORE  remain  fully valid  for economic analysis. Decisions should be 
based  on  evidence,  and  reasonable  effort  should  be  made  to  obtain  the  most  relevant  and 
important  evidence. With  large mine  action  or  ERW/UXO  programmes,  for  example,  it would  be 













 Actual  or  potential  resource‐based  conflicts  between  social  groups  (e.g.  pastoralists  and 
settled agricultural communities) and how mine action/ERW operations might affect those 
conflicts 
 The  national  development  strategy  and  how  progress  in  implementing  that  strategy will 
alter the socio‐economy and the livelihoods of people over time 
 How  the  government  and,  where  relevant,  its  donors  plan,  budget  for,  and  implement 
development investments3 
This  issue  brief  provides  an  overview  of  how  economic  thinking  applies  to MORE  contexts, with 
simple examples to illustrate how economic analysis can be applied to ensure officials and managers 
at  all  levels  are  considering  all  evidence  that  is  relevant,  important  and  reasonable  to obtain  for 
informing decisions. It is organized into two parts: 
1. Economic analysis of individual MORE (residual) tasks 
2. Country  ‐wide  economic  analysis  to  inform  strategy  and  policy‐making  for  operating  in 
MORE contexts. 









(i)  location,  (ii) ERW  contamination  and  (iii)  a  specific use of  the  land,  there  are other  important 
questions that any mine action programme must address, such as:  
 What risks are present as a result of the ERW contamination? 





















also  useful  to  inform  policies  (e.g.  in  what  situations  should  we  always  clear?),  to  set  relative 
priorities for broad categories of  land uses (e.g. should we give priority to rice fields or orchards?), 
and  to demonstrate  to government and donors  that  the programme  is delivering value‐for‐money 
and worthy of continued support. 




















Assessment) Outcome no. – description  1  2  3 

















































Damage requiring repair  4.  1.0% * £10,000 =  £ 100 







This  example  also  illustrates  the  basic  division  of  labour  between mine  action  practitioners  and 
economists:  
 Mine  action  practitioners  are  best  placed  to  assess  the  risks  of  an  undesirable  outcome, 
together with the mitigation options and their effectiveness in reducing risks 
 Economists are best placed to assess the economic costs that would be  incurred should an 
undesirable  event happen,  as well  as  the economic benefits which would  accrue  through 
successful risk mitigation. 
Real  life  situations  are often more  complicated  than  the  example  above.  There usually  are more 
potential outcomes: for example, a detonation might damage more than one piece of equipment or 
cause an  injury to workers.  It might also damage the work already done,  leading to reconstruction 
costs.  It  could also  result  in  fines  from  the building  inspection authority, or  lawsuits  from nearby 
homeowners whose windows were broken by the blast.  
It  can  be  complicated  to  think  through  all  the  possible  outcomes  and  calculating  the  EVs,  and 






Economic  analysis  is  often  favoured  by  decision‐makers  because  the  results  are  presented  in 
monetary  terms which  are easily understood  and  readily  comparable  across  the options,  such  as 
possible clearance projects. This feature – the use of financial values as a common measuring stick – 













MORE contexts. The challenge, however,  is  to ensure  the  financial results are  truly based on valid 




complete  accounting  by  incorporating  both  direct  and  indirect  costs  and  benefits.  Through 
experience and experiment, economists have also developed techniques to estimate financial values 












As  well,  some  economists  have  developed  approaches  for  estimating  the  economic  value  of 
intangibles, such as clean air and even human life, so these are not overlooked by decision‐makers. 



























versus‐oranges problem. Economists approach  this problem by  looking  for a common measure of 
the benefit. If we can convert these dissimilar benefits into money terms, for example,12 it is easy to 
compare them, converting an apples‐versus‐oranges problem to one of apples‐versus‐apples. 
Most economic analysis uses a set of  tools  that, collectively, are  termed cost‐benefit analysis.13  In 




















of a  rate of  return  (based on  the  return we would expect  to earn on our money  from alternative 
uses, such as interest‐earning bank deposits or another investment). 
For example, consider an offer  to exchange $100  today  for some amount a year  from now. What 
would you consider a fair trade: perhaps $100 today for $110 a year from now?15 This  implies you 
expect to earn a rate of return of 10% per year, as $110  is 110% (10% more) of $100. At this rate, 
















































































There  always  is  a  danger  that  managers,  donors,  etc.  will  make  decisions  based  on  seriously 
incomplete  information.  As  is  illustrated  in  the  example  below,  decisions  based  on  a  complete 




























However,  decisions  relating  to MORE  generally  arise well  after  the  emergency  phase  of  a mine 
action programme, so more complete data should be available. Still,  there  is a more  fundamental 








income  and  can  buy  more  goods  from  the  shops.  As  well,  in  future  the  farmers  may  exclude 
pastoralists  who  previously  used  the  land  to  graze  their  livestock.  This  is  an  indirect  cost  to 
pastoralists, who would not be able to maintain as many animals.  
Indirect  effects  are  costs  and  benefits  that  are  passed  on  to  people  not  directly  involved  in  the 
project through the market Because there is a market for these, it is relatively easy to determine the 

























Often,  there  are  other  external  effects where  there  is  no market mechanism:  for  example,  the 
benefit  of  greater  public  safety  or  the  risk  that  forests  will  be  despoiled  if  ERW  is  removed.23 













Needless  to  say,  such  studies  are  controversial,  as  is  the  concept  of  VSL  itself. Where  possible, 
analysts will use non‐financial measures of benefits, such as disability adjusted  life years (DALYs),27 
and employ cost effectiveness analysis to assess investments in terms of the cost to save one DALY. 
However,  when  considering  investments  which  yield  both  financial  and  safety  benefits,  such  as 
MORE  projects, we may  still  be  left with  an  apples‐versus‐oranges  comparison:  one  project may 
yield  greater  financial  benefits  and  the  other  greater  improvements  in  public  safety.  A  policy 
decision is required. But the “all reasonable effort” principle means that significant decisions of this 
type should be informed by a reasonable amount of economic analysis. 






















an estimate of  the  financial benefits of a  reduction  in deaths and accidents generally used  the present 
value  (PV)  of  lost  earnings, which  is  a  very  low  amount  in  poor  countries  emerging  from  conflict:  for 
example, the first published academic article used 1998 GDP per capita of $134 as the basis for calculating 





 There  is no convincing study  to  relate  the area cleared with  the decline  in  landmine casualties 
(i.e. we simply don’t know how much casualties would fall due to clearance) 
 Most fundamentally, people value their lives for more than the income they earn 
Confronting  this  last  problem,  a  team  of  researchers  estimated  the  VSL  of  rural  Cambodians  using  a 
survey;** basically,  they asked how much money a  farmer would need  to move  from a  landmine‐free 
province  to  a  contaminated  province,  assuming  all  other  factors  stayed  the  same.  They  arrived  at  an 
estimate of over USD 350,000 for a rural Cambodian in 2004, about 135 times higher than the PV estimate 
based on lost earnings. 
* GEOFF HARRIS.  (2000). The Economics of  Landmine Clearance: Case Study of Cambodia.  Journal of  International 
Development,  12(2):  219‐225.  There  were  many  other  problems  with  this  article.  See  TED  PATERSON.  (2001). 
Commentary  on  ‘The  economics  of  landmine  clearance:  case  study  of  Cambodia’.  Journal  of  International 
Development, 13(5): 629–634. 
** MICHAEL CAMERON,  JOHN GIBSON, KENT HELMERS, STEVEN LIM,  JOHN TRESSLER and KIEN VADDANAK  (2010). 












 When  should  international  actors  exit  from  a  national mine  action  programme,  and  how 
should they manage their exit?    
This  requires  economic  analysis  over  time,  and  from  a  programme‐wide  or  “programme‐based” 






the  international  community  often  mounts  a  peacekeeping  or  stabilization  mission  to  establish 








a  “surge”  of  financial  and  technical  assistance  (see  also  Figure  1),  which  raises  a  number  of 
interrelated questions: 
 What will be accomplished during the surge? 


















 What  level  of  mine  action  services  will  need  to  be  sustained  to  address  the  residual 
contamination? 








A  surge  of  international  mine  action  support  to  a  country  is  based  on  multiple  motives: 
humanitarianism; the need to support peacekeeping or stabilization efforts; treaty obligations; the 
desire  to promote reconstruction and development; and  the  international community’s  interest  in 
preventing  state  failure  and  a  return  to  conflict.  The  importance  of  these motives  varies  among 
donors and over the life of a mine action programme, but the result tends to be significant progress 
in  clearing  surface  and  shallow  contamination  in  areas  that  endanger  public  safety,  plus  any 
contamination  that  constrains  reconstruction  and  development  investments.  In  a  few  cases, 





































 It  remains unclear how  long  international donors will be willing  to  finance a  surge  in mine action 
support  in countries heavily affected by buried ERW. The bulk of this contamination  is not covered 
by  international  conventions  and  does  not  pose  an  immediate  threat  to  public  safety,  nor  a 
constraint  on  planned  investments.  These  countries  probably  cannot  expect  broad‐based 
international  support  after  the  clearance  of  (i)  surface  and  shallow  contamination  in  areas  that 
endanger  public  safety  and  (ii)  any  contamination  that  is  justified  in  economic  terms  (e.g.  it 
constrains  reconstruction  and  development  investments  or  contaminates  key  livelihoods  assets) 
during  the surge.31 Using  this  logic, economic analysis has been conducted  in Lao PDR  to estimate 











Benefits per unit of  land will also  start  very high,  as work  starts on  the highest priorities:  critical 
infrastructure, routes being used by returning refugees, urban areas, etc. Benefits per unit of  land 
will  also  decline  as  the  mine  action  programme  works  down  the  list  of  priorities  through  rural 
infrastructure, irrigated agricultural areas, good rain‐fed cropland, and so on. Eventually, all the high‐ 
and medium‐value land will have been cleared, and at some point the costs of demining will exceed 
the economic benefits arising  from  that  land. A proactive demining programme will no  longer be 
justified in economic terms.  





A 2002 evaluation of  the UXO programme  in  Lao PDR used work  commissioned  to develop a 
master plan  for  agricultural development  to  estimate  the  area of  land with  good  agricultural 
potential on which UXO contamination was  suspected  (arriving at 23,680 hectares).*  In 2008, 
another  evaluation  team  revised  this  estimate  and  conducted  a  cost‐benefit  analysis  to 
determine  the  total area  that was “worth doing”  (i.e. suitable  for  turning  into  rice paddies)  in 








 international donors would  remain engaged  to  that point, but  from experience  to date  it  is  likely 
they would, provided that the government makes it clear that mine action is a priority.  







Once  an  estimate  is  made  of  the  area  that  will  be  surveyed  and  cleared  during  the  surge  of 
international  support,  it  would  be  a  trivial  matter  to  calculate  the  residual  risk  /residual 
contamination if there is a reasonably accurate estimate of the extent of the total contamination in 
the country. Unfortunately, it has proved difficult to obtain accurate estimates even for surface and 
shallow  contamination,33  let  alone  the  extent  of  buried  ERW.  As  a  result,  estimates  for  areas 
contaminated by buried ERW  in countries which have experienced significant aerial bombardment 

































contaminated  that would  require  deep  clearance.  Some  “back  of  the  envelope”  calculations  for 
Vietnam make this readily apparent. 
 
Vietnam  suffers  from widespread explosives  contamination, both  surface/shallow  contamination and deeper 
contamination, mainly from aerial bombs. Surface/shallow contamination represents the principal public safety 
concern,  posing  risks  for  normal  livelihood  activities.  This  surface/shallow  contamination  also  poses  risks  to 
community and rural development initiatives involving light construction or intensified land use.  Larger public 









For  these  land  uses,  clearance  below  30  cm. will  only  be  required  for:  expansion  of  the  built  environment; 
rebuilding  infrastructure  (e.g. upgrading  roads); and  intensified  land use  (e.g.  larger urban buildings, but also 




























Whenever  the  proactive  demining  programme  ends,  there  will  still  be  a  requirement  for  a 
sustainable  capacity  to  address  the  residual  contamination,  particularly  in  countries which  have 
suffered from extensive aerial bombardment. The basic requirement is to support public and private 
physical investment in infrastructure, factories, urban expansion, and so on. (In terms of the analysis 
depicted  in Figure 3, new  investments have  the effect of dramatically  increasing  the benefit  from 
clearing specific CHA in the areas being developed.)  









There  are  a  number  of  policy  issues  that  governments  need  to  address  if  this  capacity  is  to  be 
sustained.  For  example,  who  should  finance  the  survey  and  clearance  of  areas  planned  for 











Another  issue  is flexibility  in terms of expanding or reducing the capacity.  In Vietnam for example, 
total investment – which drives the demand for demining services – continued to grow rapidly until 
2008, slowed for two years, and then went flat before resuming in 2011 (albeit at a slower rate). As a 
result,  demand  for  demining  services  peaked  in  2009  at  over  $80  million,  and  then  declined 
significantly.36 National authorities would have to reduce the demining capacity (perhaps by  letting 












































 Clearance  of  surface/shallow  UXO  to  30  cm  in  depth  (30  cm  is  the  minimum  depth 
requirement for clearance for agricultural or general livelihood use)  
 If called for, search for UXO to 3 metres, plus excavation and removal of any items located 
 If called  for,  search  for UXO between 3 metres and 5 metres,  followed by excavation and 
removal of any items located 


































Vietnam,  for  example,  sub‐national  governments  have  long  lists  of  approved  projects,  but  it  is 
unclear whether or when many of  these projects will actually be  implemented.41 Regardless,  if an 
area was being cleared for, say, immediate agricultural use, sub‐national authorities often would ask 
for clearance to 5 metres because they had a development project approved for the site – the only 
thing  lacking was  financing  for  the development project.  (The  local authorities also might believe 
they would be more likely to obtain construction financing if the site was already cleared.) 
So…  is  it ever warranted  to  clear  to 5 metres depth  to  support  an  investment project when  it  is 
uncertain whether or when the project will be constructed?42 Generally, we do not need to calculate 
the likely economic returns stemming from the investment project as can accept the fact that some 




1. A  site  has  been  selected  for  survey  and  clearance,  and  the  immediate  land  use will  be 
agriculture 
2. Some  of  the  site  (say,  10  hectares) may  be  devoted  to  a  development  project  –  already 
approved by the district authorities but awaiting finance 













A common situation  in Vietnam and many other countries  is  that an agency  (a government; an NGO; a 
private  investor) has some plan  for a significant  investment, but  the construction date  is not known  for 
certain. For example,  sub‐national governments  (provincial; district;  commune) all have  five‐year  socio‐
economic development plans, together with “public investment programmes” – basically, lists of planned 
and approved development projects. But these sub‐national governments do not have sufficient taxing or 
borrowing  authority  to  finance  these  investments  on  their  own.  Therefore,  they  depend  on  either  (i) 

















Note  that  Figure  7  is  based  on  the  expected  values  of  the  two  decision  options  based  on  the 
likelihood the  investment project will proceed this year. What  if  it  is approved for  implementation 






not get  implemented this year,  it would be more  likely to get funded the following year. However, 




cases;  rather,  they  are  faced with decisions  about  specific  sites  and  specific  investment projects. 






























investment  projects  being  funded  and  the  number  of  demands  placed  on  survey  and  clearance 
teams. In Vietnam, for example, both public and private investment was growing rapidly until 2008, 
but  then slowed markedly. Private  investment  fell because of  the slowdown  in demand caused by 
the 2008 financial crisis, and the national government began tightening‐up on loans from state banks 
due to the build‐up in bad debts within the banking sector. It became far less likely that “approved” 


















commonly,  the  aim  is  to  determine  the  least‐cost  alternative  to  achieving  a  defined  outcome, 
although  sometimes  the  aim  is  to  find  the  best  combination  of  price  and  quality.  In  cost‐
effectiveness  analysis,  all  costs  are  presented  in  financial  terms,  but  the  outcome  is  not.  For 
example, if the aim is to reduce UXO accidents, the result of the analysis might be presented as Cost 
per accident avoided. This means that all alternative projects aimed at reducing accidents could be 






confirmed  that  the  land  would  be  suitable  for  rice  paddies  and  that  the  farm  households  listed  as 



































  Cost/ha  ha  Likelihood  EMV 
Mobilization to site (TS)  250  n.a.  100%  250 
TS (of 2.5 ha)  1,200  2.5  100%  3,000 
1. No clearance  0  n.a.  10%  0 
2. Partial clearance (3 ha)  2,100  3  60%  3,780 






  Cost/ha  ha  Likelihood  EMV 
Mobilization to site (TS)  250  n.a.  100%  250 
TS (of 2.5 ha)  1,200  2.5  100%  3,000 
No clearance  0  n.a.  10%  0 
Partial clearance (3 ha)  2,100  3  30%  1,890 
































1. One call‐out  10% * 60% = 6%   $2,000 * 1 call‐out  120 
Two call‐outs  10% * 30% = 3%   $2,000 * 2 call‐outs  120 
Three call‐outs  10% * 10% = 1%   $2,000 * 3 call‐outs  60 
Don’t encounter UXO  90%  $0  0 












it  focuses on direct, private  costs, but on occasion  some of  the effects on  the wider  community, 
country, etc. due to indirect costs and benefits or externalities are taken into account.  



























































NPV  and  B:C  do  not  always  give  the  same  result  because  NPV  is  affected  by  the  size  of  the 
investment, while  the B:C  (a pure number)  is  invariant  to  scale.  In  the example above,  the B:C of 
option 2 is higher (1.100 to 1.037), but the NPV of 1 (EUR 24, 147) is higher than the NPV of Option 
2. This  is because Option 1  is a  far bigger  investment, requiring  the businesswoman  to  invest EUR 
660,000 (to earn EUR 24, 147), whereas Option 2 requires an outlay of only EUR 30,000. 
If the businesswoman had other attractive investment options, she would probably stick with Option 






The  general  rule  is  to  value  resources  based  on  their  ‘best  alternative  use’,  so  the  appropriate 
discount rate depends on what alternative investments might be made in that country at that time. 












this  is no  longer an obstacle: Excel,  for example, has an  ‘IRR’  function built  into  it. Given  this,  it  is 









of  lands  for  crops.  The  effect  of  productivity  growth  is  exponential.  So,  for  example,  if  this  land 













1  $306  6  $338 
2  $312  7  $345 
3  $318  8  $351 
4  $325  9  $359 
5  $331  10  $366 
 
How many years should we model? 
There  is no  simple  answer  to  this. As we  extend  the number of  years  in our model, discounting 




increases.  Is  it even reasonable  to analyse more  than a decade  into  the  future when so much will 
change, particularly in fast growing economies such as Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam? 











the  local  poverty  line,  a  poverty  focus  could  be  implemented  by  identifying,  say,  food‐insecure 
households (e.g. those  lacking sufficient  land to farm) and giving extra weight to expected benefits 
flowing to those households.49 
A  similar  approach  could  be  used  to  give  greater weight  to many  socio‐economic  development 
priorities, such as gender (e.g. give extra weight to projects in which most beneficiaries are women) 
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